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The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), 1 proposed by the National Confer-
ence on Uniform State Laws in 1955, has been adopted by slightly more than
half the states.' The purpose of this survey is to explain the principles underly-
ing court decisions interpreting the UAA, and provide a framework for ana-
lyzing future cases.3
I. VARIATIONS ON THE UAA
Many states have adopted versions that differ from the model act. 4 Iowa
recently adopted the UAA 5 and omitted,e modified,7 and added 8 some signifi-
cant provisions. The most significant omissions were sections 21 and 22. Sec-
tion 21 provides for uniform interpretation of the UAA.9 Iowa has determined
that its judiciary should interpret the statute without regard to the interpreta-
tion of other jurisdictions. This defeats the goal of uniformity. The UAA stip-
ulates that all its provisions are severable.1" Its omission permits the entire
Iowa arbitration statute to be stricken if one section of the act is declared
1. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25 (1955), 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as UAA].
2. Jurisdictions that have enacted statutes modeled after the UAA include
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.
3. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REV.
137 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments]. The 1983 survey collected re-
cent cases interpreting and applying the UAA decided before September, 1982. This
article surveys cases decided between September, 1982 and September, 1983.
4. See, e.g., Recent Developments, supra note 3, at 139-46.
5. IOWA CODE §§ 679A.1-.19 (1983).
6. Sections 13(c), 15, 17, 21, 22, and 23 of the UAA were omitted from the
Iowa statute.
7. Sections 1, 3, 5, 7(d), and 8(b) of the UAA were modified in the Iowa
statute.
8. Sections 679A. 12(f) and 679A. 19 were added to the Iowa statute, neither of
which is found in the UAA.
9. UAA § 21 states: "This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it."
10. UAA § 22 states:
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.
[Vol. 1984
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unconstitutional. The absence of a severablility provision may make it more
difficult for a court to hold that a section of the statute is unconstitutional
since such a ruling would invalidate the entire Act. 1
Iowa also modified several provisions of the UAA. First, Iowa modified
section 1 of the UAA 12 to prohibit arbitration of contracts of adhesion, em-
ployment contracts, or "any claim sounding in tort, whether or not involving a
breach of contract.1
13
Second, Iowa modified the law concerning the appointment of arbitrators
by the court if an appointed arbitrator fails or is unable to act. Section 3 of
the UAA gives an appointed arbitrator "all the powers of one specifically
named in the agreement."'" The Iowa provision replaces "all the powers" with
"the same powers". 1 5 Although only a majority of the arbitrators is required
to exercise power under both acts," a neutral arbitrator appointed by the
court or the American Arbitration Association (AAA) may have the addi-
tional power to serve as chairperson under the UAA.1
7
Third, the Iowa statute changed section 5 of the UAA, which allows the
parties, by mutual consent, to postpone the hearing to a time later than that
fixed by the agreement.16 Iowa does not permit postponement beyond the time
11. Five other states have also omitted this section from their versions of the
UAA: Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Massachusetts, and Nevada. 7 U.L.A. 81 (1978).
12. UAA § 1:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or
a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereof arising between the parties is enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
This act also applies to arbitration agreements between employers and em-
ployees or between their respective representatives [unless otherwise provided
in their agreement].
13. IowA CODE § 679A.1 (1983); cf. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (Supp. 1983)
(prohibits arbitration of contracts of insurance and contracts of adhesion).
14. UAA § 3 states:
If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of arbi-
trators, this method shall be followed. In the absence thereof, or if the method
fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator appointed
fails or is unable to act and his successor has not been duly appointed, the
court on application of a party shall appoint one or more arbitrators. An arbi-
trator so appointed has all the powers of one specifically named in the
agreement.
15. IOWA CODE § 679A.3 (1983).
16. Id. § 679A.5 (1983); UAA § 5.
17. See Foley Co. v. Grinsted Prods., Inc., 233 Kan. 339, 345, 662 P.2d 1254,
1255 (1983).
18. UAA § 5 states:
Unless otherwise provided by the agreement: (a) The arbitrators shall
appoint a time and place for the hearing and cause notification to the parties
to be served personally or by registered mail not less than five days before the
3
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fixed by the agreement.1 The UAA allows the parties to apply to a court for a
motion to compel the arbitrators to proceed even though a party duly notified
fails to appear." The Iowa statute provides that the arbitrators may proceed,
but does not grant the right to request a judicial motion to compel." Finally,
the UAA provides that if an arbitrator ceases to act, the remaining arbitrators
"appointed to act as neutrals" may continue and render judgment." An arbi-
trator is appointed to act as a neutral under the UAA if he is chosen by the
court or by the AAA." Iowa allows the remaining arbitrators to proceed
whether or not they are appointed to act as neutrals."
Fourth, Iowa modified section 8(b) of the UAA, which governs the time
for making an award. The Iowa statute provides that an arbitration award
must be made within thirty days after the arbitration hearing unless otherwise
agreed." The UAA provides a more flexible yet complicated rule. It requires
that the award be made within the time fixed by the agreement, or if not so
fixed, the time fixed by a court order entered upon application by a party.
Parties may extend this time period by a written stipulation before or after
expiration of the time period. A party objecting that the time for making the
award has expired must notify the arbitrators before delivery of the award, or
the objection is waived."1
Iowa has introduced some new provisions. First, the state has added an
additional ground for vacating an award: when "substantial evidence on the
record does not support the award.""' A party's right to request review for
hearing. Appearance at the hearing waives such notice. The arbitrators may
adjourn the hearing from time to time as necessary and, on request of a party
and for good cause, or upon their own motion may postpone the hearing to a
time not later than the date fixed by the agreement for making the award
unless the parties consent to a later date. The arbitrators may hear and deter-
mine the controversy upon the evidence produced notwithstanding the failure
of a party duly notified to appear. The court on application may direct the
arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing and determination of the
controversy. (b) The parties are entitled to be heard, to present evidence ma-
terial to the controversy and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the
hearing. (c) The hearing shall be conducted by all the arbitrators but a ma-
jority may determine any question and render a final award. If, during the
course of the hearing, an arbitrator for any reason ceases to act, the remain-
ing arbitrator or arbitrators appointed to act as neutrals may continue with
the hearing and determine the controversy.
19. IowA CODE § 679A.5 (1983).
20. UAA § 5.
21. IOWA CODE § 679A.5 (1983).
22. UAA § 5.
23. Id.
24. IOWA CODE § 679A.5 (1983).
25. Id. § 679A.8.
26. UAA § 8(b).
27. IOWA CODE § 679A.12(f) (1983).
[Vol. 1984
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substantial evidence is waived, however, if: the parties have agreed otherwise;
the claimant fails to produce the record; or the "arbitration has been con-
ducted under the auspices of the AAA.""'
Second, Iowa added a provision requiring that disputes between govern-
mental agencies be arbitrated. The agencies are each allowed to pick an arbi-
trator, and the governor picks the third. All litigation between governmental
agencies is absolutely prohibited, and the arbitrators' decision is final and
unappealable.2 '
II. VALIDITY OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
The UAA enforces written arbitration agreements except when legal or
equitable grounds exist to revoke the contract."0 The arbitrators' jurisdiction is
entirely dependent on the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. 1 An ar-
bitration agreement may be challenged by raising typical contract defenses,
and may also be declared unenforceable for reasons of public policy." Recent
cases suggest four considerations affecting the validity of an arbitration agree-
ment: (1) whether the arbitration statute should be construed to avoid statu-
tory exceptions; (2) whether principles of construction found in contract law
should be applied to arbitration agreements; (3) when the defense of the inva-
lidity of the arbitration agreement may be raised; and (4) whether public poli-
cies outside of the arbitration statute restrict the enforceability of agreements.
A. Statutory Construction
Exceptions to the UAA restricting arbitrability are narrowly construed to
bring as many agreements as possible within the coverage of the arbitration
statute." This principle was ignored in a recent Kansas case. In National Ed-
ucation Association v. Unified School District," a Kansas appellate court in-
terpreted the scope of the validity clause of the Kansas version of the UAA.35
28. Id.
29. Id. § 679A.19.
30. UAA § 1.
31. See, e.g., Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enterprises, 414 Mich. 95,
98, 323 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1982).
32. See, e.g., Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 385 Mass. 813,
-, 434 N.E.2d 611, 617-18 (1982) (arbitration would not be enforced in violation of
consumer protection laws or regulations).
33. See, e.g., National Camera, Inc. v. Love, 644 P.2d 94 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982); see also Recent Developments, supra note 3, at 147.
34. 7 Kan. App. 2d 529, 644 P.2d 1006 (1982).
35. While the Kansas arbitration statute basically conforms to the UAA, the
two acts differ on whether employment contracts are arbitrable. The UAA expressly
extends its coverage to such contracts. UAA § 1. The Kansas statute excludes such
contracts from its coverage. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1982). Instead, such contracts
are governed by another statute. Id. § 72-5424(a) (1982).
1984]
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The plaintiff was a teacher seeking confirmation of an arbitration award relat-
ing to his contract with the school district.3 6 The court held that the Kansas
act did not apply to the plaintiff's employment contract because the statute
was "plain and unambiguous" in its exclusion of all employment contracts,
regardless of whether the employer was in the private or public sector.3 7
B. Application of Contract Principles
Recent cases have raised the question whether contract principles should
be applied in determining the validity of arbitration agreements. The general
rule is that contract principles governing construction and interpretation apply
to arbitration agreements."
In Willis Flooring, Inc. v. Howard S. Lease Construction Co.,39 a con-
tractor and a subcontractor entered into a contract to install a floor. The con-
tract gave the contractor the sole option to require arbitration of any dispute
arising under the contract. When the contractor attempted to compel arbitra-
tion, the subcontractor claimed that the arbitration clause was invalid for lack
of mutuality. The court applied common law contract principles and concluded
that the clause was valid.40 The arbitration clause was binding to the extent
that the whole contract was binding. The court reasoned that such a clause
need not be supported by separate consideration.41
In Himmelstein v. Valenti Development Corp.,4 2 the plaintiff contracted
to buy a home from the defendant builder. The contract contained several
express warranties concerning the quality of the home, and a clause requiring
arbitration of disputes.43 Before conveyance of the property, the plaintiff ob-
served water leaking through a crack in a basement wall. The architect ex-
amined the building as the contract required." Although he found no struc-
tural defects, the architect could not predict with certainty whether the
seepage problem had been fully repaired. The defendant interpreted the archi-
36. 7 Kan. App. 2d at , 644 P.2d at 1007.
37. 7 Kan. App. 2d at , 644 P.2d at 1009.
38. Recent Developments, supra note 3, at 147.
39. 656 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983).
40. Id. at 1185.
41. Id. at 1185-86.
42. 103 I11. App. 3d 911, 431 N.E.2d 1299 (1983).
43. Article 8 of the contract provided:
Any dispute between Purchaser and Seller with respect to labor and/or
material, or whether the residence has been constructed as herein required,
shall be determined by the architect preparing plans and specifications and
such determination shall be conclusive and binding upon Purchaser and
Seller.
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tect's report to mean that no substantial defect existed in the premises, 45 so it
scheduled a closing. The plaintiff refused to accept a deed to the property or
tender the balance owing on the contract, and the defendant invoked a forfei-
ture clause. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the forfeiture, reform or rescind the
contract, and collect damages for the builder's pre-contract tortious misrepre-
sentation. The trial court dismissed all counts of plaintiff's petition except the
misrepresentation count. In dictum, the appellate court found that the refusal
to dismiss the misrepresentation count was correct.46 It reasoned that since
arbitration agreements are not enforceable if grounds exist for revoking the
contract, the arbitration clause in the contract could not extend to the misrep-
resentation issue.4
7
In Computer Corp. of America v. Zarecor,'48 the plaintiff, Computer Cor-
poration of America (CCA), and European Market Consultants (EMC) en-
tered into a licensing agreement which provided that all diputes between the
parties would be arbitrated.4 9 Defendants Copeland and Zarecor negotiated
the contract for EMC, and Copeland signed the agreement as president of
EMC. When CCA later sued Copeland and Zapecor individually for the ini-
tial licensing fee, Copeland moved for arbitration of the dispute. The court
found that the contract showed no intent to bind Copeland or Zarecor, and
held that neither could enforce the arbitration clause.50
A disagreement arose concerning the sale of a business in Saltner v.
Farner."1 Just prior to trial, the parties signed an agreement to arbitrate the
dispute. The agreement did not require the arbitrator to take an oath. Al-
though a Colorado court rule required arbitrators to take an oath before con-
ducting arbitration,"2 the Colorado version of the UAA did not.58 Neither
party had submitted an oath form to the arbitrator. The court held that the
arbitrator's failure to take an oath did not invalidate the award." It reasoned
that the arbitration statute controlled a pre-existing, inconsistent procedural
rule and that the arbitration agreement controlled in the absence of consistent
45. The contract required the builder to repair, replace, or otherwise attend to
"substantial defects" in the real estate for one year after possession was delivered to
the buyer. Id. at 912, 431 N.E.2d at 1300.
46. The appellate court did not question the propriety of the trial court's action
in not dismissing the tort count. Id. at 916, 431 N.E.2d at 1302.
47. Id.
48. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 452 N.E.2d 267 (1983).
49. The contract provided that the "agreement shall be binding upon, and inure
to the benefit of CCA and licensee and their respective legal representatives, sucessors
and permitted assigns" and that the "agreement is personal to the licensee." Id. at
452 N.E.2d at 269.
50. Id. at - , 452 N.E.2d at 269-70.
51. 653 P.2d 413 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
52. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 109(c).
53. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-207 (1973).
54. Salter, 653 P.2d at 414.
1984]
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statutory requirements."
C. Time Limits on Raising the Invalidity Defense
A third consideration affecting the validity of an arbitration agreement is
whether there are any time limitations placed on raising the invalidity defense.
Where the party seeking to raise the defense participated in a prior arbitration
proceeding without raising the defense, no right exists to raise the defense in a
judicial proceeding to confirm the award." Where the party challenging valid-
ity opted not to appear at the arbitration proceeding, he may then raise that
defense in later judicial proceedings.57
This question was discussed in Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin
Enterprises." The plaintiff sought to have an arbitrator's award confirmed.
The defendant did not appear at the prior arbitration proceeding, although he
acknowledged receiving a notice of submission of the claim to arbitration and
a notice of the award. In the confirmation proceeding, the defendant for the
first time challenged the validity of the agreement. The Michigan Supreme
Court held that the defense was timely.59 The court also held that an arbitra-
tor cannot decide whether a contract to arbitrate exists or whether such a
contract is enforceable.60 While agreeing that a "wait and see" approach to
challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement is not allowed where the
party participated in the arbitration proceeding, the court found that a party
who chooses not to participate in the proceeding is not required to seek an
injunction to stay the arbitration proceeding in order to preserve the invalidity
defense. The receipt of a notice letter imposes no duty on someone not bound
by an arbitration agreement."1 As long as the party does not participate, the
defense may be timely raised in the later confirmation proceeding."
55. Id.
56. Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enters., 414 Mich. 95, 101, 323
N.E.2d 1, 3 (1982).
57. Id. at 100, 323 N.W.2d at 3.
58. Id. at 95, 323 N.W.2d at 1.
59. Id. at 101, 323 N.W.2d at 3.
60. Id. at 99, 323 N.E.2d at 2.
61. "If a burden must be placed on one of the parties to seek a preliminary
judicial determination, it should be on the party seeking to compel arbitration." Id. at
100, 323 N.E.2d at 3.
62. Plaintiff also asserted that the defense was, in essence, an application to va-
cate the award and should have been filed within twenty days of the delivery of a copy
of the award. See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 769.9(2).
An application under this Rule shall be made within 20 days after deliv-
ery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon
corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within 20 days after
such grounds are known or should have been known.
The court rejected this argument because the defendant was not seeking to
[Vol. 1984214
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D. Statutory Causes of Action
A fourth consideration affecting the validity of an arbitration agreement
is a state policy favoring litigation of certain statutory causes of action, which
renders unenforceable an arbitration agreement covering this activity.e8
In Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc.," the plaintiff had
purchased a swimming pool from the defendant. Before construction was com-
pleted, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant alleging violations of
the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Law." The statute provided, "Any
person entitled to bring an action under this section shall not be required to
initiate, pursue or exhaust any remedy established by any regulation, adminis-
trative procedure, local, state or federal law or statute or the common law in
order to bring an action under this section." 66 The trial court stayed the law-
suit and compelled arbitration. The appellate court held that the trial court
erred in requiring arbitration, finding that arbitration pursuant to a contract
fell into either the statutory or common law category. 7 The Consumer Protec-
tion Law claims were not arbitrable, but other issues relating to the contract
were unaffected, and the defendant could compel arbitration on those separate
issues. 68
III. WAIVER
The right to demand arbitration may be waived.6 A party who partici-
pates in litigation which results in a final judgment on the merits without de-
manding arbitration usually waives his right to do so.7 0 Some lesser degree of
participation in litigation may constitute a waiver. Waiver can also occur
through dilatory tactics that result in unreasonable delay or prejudice to the
opposing party.7 1 For example, if a party does not heed a requirement in his
contract that a motion to compel arbitration be filed within a reasonable time,
vacate the award, but instead opposing its confirmation. Therefore, there was no time
limit on raising the invalidity defense. Arrow, 414 Mich. at 101 323 N.E.2d at 3.
63. Recent Developments, supra note 3, at 152.
64. 385 Mass. 813, 434 N.E.2d 611 (1982).
65. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West Supp. 1982).
66. Id. § 9(6). But cf. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984) (Cali-
fornia franchise law permitting franchisee to sue franchisor without exhausting any
other remedies held to conflict with Federal Arbitration Act and thus was preempted
by federal legislation).
67. Hannon, 385 Mass. at _, 434 N.E.2d at 618-19.
68. Id.
69. Recent Developments, supra note 3, at 154.
70. Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1152 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 838 (1982).
71. See Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assocs., 412 So. 2d 871,
874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition denied, 419 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1982), appeal al-
lowed, 429 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
19841
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waiver may occur.7 2 Likewise, a party who acts in a manner inconsistent with
his right to arbitrate may waive that right.78 Nevertheless, waiver will not be
inferred from equivocal acts or language;74 intent to waive the right of arbitra-
tion must be clearly shown.7
5
A. Dilatory Conduct
Stauffer Construction Co. v. Board of Education 7 involved a contract for
the renovation of a school. The school board filed a judicial action seeking a
stay of arbitration. The trial court found that the company had waived its
right to demand arbitration because it had waited too long in filing its demand
for arbitration. The court recognized the possibility that a party could waive
its right to arbitrate either by waiting too long to demand arbitration or by
filing a lawsuit against the opposing party. 7
Waiver based upon dilatory conduct was asserted in County of Clark v.
Blanchard Construction Co.7 1 A subcontractor brought suit against his con-
tractor, who then filed a third-party claim against the owner. One year after
filing suit, the subcontractor and the contractor moved to compel arbitration,
and their motion was granted. The arbitrator found in favor of the subcontrac-
tor and allowed the contractor indemnification from the owner. The owner
contended that the contractor had waived his right to arbitration by filing the
third-party claim. The Nevada Supreme Court refused to find a waiver of the
contractor's right to arbitrate. The court held that only unreasonable delay in
demanding arbitration constitutes waiver and that participation in litigation
constitutes waiver only if it prejudices the other party.70 The court also re-
jected the notion that the mere existence of conduct claimed to be inconsistent
with asserting a right to arbitrate, without more, could constitute waiver.80
72. Stauffer Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 54 Md. App. 658, 667-71, 460 A.2d
609, 614-16 (1983).
73. Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assocs., 412 So. 2d at 871.
But see County of Clark v. Blanchard Constr. Co., 98 Nev. 488, 491, 653 P.2d 1217,
1220 (1982).
74. Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443,
444, 450 A.2d 1304, 1305 (1982).
75. Id.
76. 54 Md. App. 658, 460 A.2d 609 (1983).
77. On remand, the trial court was instructed to determine whether the com-
pany waived its right to arbitration by failing to make a timely demand for arbitration,
by filing a lawsuit against the board, or by failing to comply with the general condi-
tions of the construction contract. Id. at 672, 460 A.2d at 616.
78. 98 Nev. 488, 653 P.2d 1217 (1982).
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B. Participating in the Judicial Process
In Post Tensioned Engineering Corp. v. Fairway Plaza Associates,"1 the
defendant-contractor failed to bind a subcontractor to an arbitration agree-
ment, which breached the contract between the contractor and the owner-
plaintiff.82 The owner argued that the contractor's breach waived his right to
arbitrate his dispute with the owner. The court agreed that a party waives its
right to arbitration if it acts in a manner inconsistent with that right, but
found that the defendant's failure to join the subcontractor to the contract was
not inconsistent with the contractor's right to arbitrate with the owner.83
In Hanslin Builders, Inc. v. Britt Development Corp.," the court held
that when a party to an arbitration contract becomes involved in judicial pro-
ceedings, arbitration must be demanded at the proper time to prevent
waiver.65 The plaintiff-builder brought suit against the defendant-developer to
recover on two promissory notes executed by the defendant. Although the de-
veloper nominated an arbitrator, moved to dismiss the judicial proceeding
based on the the arbitration clause, and moved to stay the proceedings pending
arbitration, it never demanded arbitration during the trial. The court held that
the developer waived its right to arbitration by participating in the trial. 6 The
court reasoned that allowing the defendant to challenge the judgment by rais-
ing the issue of arbitration when defendant had never moved for an order to
compel arbitration would defeat the purposes of the arbitration statute and the
policy of finality.
7
Waiver can be limited by an agreement between the parties. In Atlas v.
7101 Partnership," a partnership agreement provided that any claims would
be settled according to the rules of the AAA.89 Section 47(a) of the AAA
rules provides: "No judicial proceedings by a party relating to the subject
matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a waiver of the party's right to arbi-
trate."90 After the defendant filed suit, the plaintiff filed two motions for pre-
liminary injunctions, which were denied, and a motion to compel arbitration.
Based on AAA rule 47(a), the court held that the filing of motions for prelimi-
81. 412 So. 2d 871, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition denied, 419 So. 2d 1197
(Fla. 1982), appealfiled, 429 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
82. Id. at 872-73.
83. Id. at 874; But see County of Clark v. Blanchard Constr. Co., 98 Nev. 488,
491, 653 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1983) (per curiam) (rejected the "inconsistency" test and
required a party claiming waiver to show prejudice if arbitration allowed).
84. 15 Mass. App. Ct. 319, 445 N.E.2d 188 (1983).
85. Id. at - , 445 N.E.2d at 190-91.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 109 11. App. 3d 236, 440 N.E.2d 381 (1982).
89. Id. at 240, 440 N.E.2d at 383.
90. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION RULES § 47(a).
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nary injunctions was not inconsistent with the right to demand arbitration. 1
The extent of the waiver caused by inconsistent conduct may be limited.
In Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Association of Jewish Charities,9" the plaintiff-
contractor agreed to build a community center for defendant-owner. While the
job was in progress, a dispute arose, and a subcontractor sued the contractor.
The contractor brought a third-party claim against the defendant-owner seek-
ing compensation for extra work done by the subcontractor. Although the is-
sue was arbitrable, none of the parties demanded arbitration, and the matter
was settled. Upon completion of the project, the owner refused to make the
final payment to the contractor because some of the work was faulty. The
contractor sought to compel arbitration. The owner argued that the contractor
had waived his right to demand arbitration by filing the third-party claim in
the earlier lawsuit. The court found that the contractor had waived its right to
arbitrate as to the extra work issue by engaging in the prior litigation, but not
its right to demand arbitration of other unrelated issues.98 An intention to
waive the right to arbitration must be established by unequivocal acts or lan-
guage and waiver of an issue through litigation is not inconsistent with an
intent to arbitrate unrelated issues arising under the same contract.'
4
IV. ARBITRABILITY
Almost any dispute can be submitted to arbitration if the parties have
agreed to arbitrate their disputes, manifested their intention in an arbitration
agreement, and presented an appropriate dispute for decision. 9  Michigan has
established a three-part test to determine whether an issue.is arbitrable: (1)
whether there is an enforceable arbitration agreement between the parties; (2)
whether the dispute is covered by the agreement; and (3) whether the arbitra-
tion agreement expressly exempts the particular dispute."
91. 109 I11. App. 3d at 241, 440 N.E.2d at 383.
92. 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982).
93. A lesser degree of participation might constitute a waiver. Id. at 449-55,
450 A.2d at 1306-07. The court noted that a number of cases have held that pursuing
litigation to a final judgment is sufficient participation to constitute a waiver. Id. at 449
n;2, 450 A.2d at 1307 n.2.
94. The court recognized a line of cases holding that litigation of one issue
waives the right to demand arbitration of all issues. The court distinguished those cases
on the ground that the issues litigated and the issues sought to be arbitrated were
interrelated in each such case. Id. at 458-60, 450 A.2d at 1308-09.
95. Arbitration' of some disputes may be prohibited by public policy or statute.
See Recent Developments, supra note 3, at 159.
96. Armoudlian v. Zedah, 116 Mich. App. 659, 323 N.W.2d 502 (1982). In
Zedah, plaintiffs sought dissolution of a partnership because of the alleged misconduct
of defendant partners. The court, after reciting the three-part test, decided that an
enforceable agreement existed, that no exemption applied, and that plaintiffs' claims
were subject to compulsory arbitration under a clause in the partnership agreement.
The court dismissed defendant's judicial action as beyond the court's jurisdiction.
[Vol. 1984
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A. Scope of the Contract
Analyzing the agreement is the first task a court faces in resolving a dis-
pute involving arbitration. Questions as to the scope of the contract generally
arise in three areas: (1) whether a given dispute is covered by the agreement;
(2) whether a party may compel arbitration under the contract; and (3)
whether an arbitrator has exceeded the agreement of the parties in reaching
his decision.
The arbitrator's goal is to implement the intent of the parties. Courts
generally rely on standard contract principles in determining intent. They look
to the arbitration clause, other contract provisions, and documents related to
or incorporated in the contract. Courts also consider the policy behind the
UAA, the language of the UAA adopted in the jurisdiction, and local substan-
tive law. Some generally recognized principles are: (1) parties may make the
agreement as broad or narrow as they wish; 9 7 (2) a party cannot be forced to
arbitrate a dispute not within the arbitration agreement;98 (3) parties may by
mutual consent submit issues not within the scope of the original agreement;"
(4) a party may not be compelled to arbitrate by a nonparty, and vice versa; 100
(5) an arbitration agreement applies to all issues arising after the execution of
the agreement; 10 1 (6) parties are not bound to arbitrate issues arising after the
contract has expired;102 and (7) interpretation of arbitration rules is up to the
arbitrator.10 3
1. Breadth of the Arbitration Clause
In Himmelstein v. Valenti Development Corp.,1 " a contract for construc-
tion of a home contained an arbitration clause which required an architect to
determine whether the house conformed to contract requirements. The buyer
sued the builder after cracks developed in the basement walls. The builder had
97. See, e.g., Grover-Remond Assocs. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 297
Minn. 324, 326, 211 N.W.2d 787, 788 (1973).
98. See, e.g., Christmas v. Cimarron Realty Co., 98 N.M. 330, 332, 648 P.2d
788, 790 (1982).
99. See, e.g., Cabus v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 644 P.2d 93, 93-94 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982).
100. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Meridian Educ. Ass'n, 112 I1. App. 3d 558,
562, 445 N.E.2d 864, 867 (1983) (nonparty cannot be compelled to arbitrate).
101. See, e.g., Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assocs., 412 So. 2d
871, 873-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition denied, 419 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1982), appeal
filed, 429 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
102. See, e.g., Lehman v. Eugene Matansky & Assocs., Inc., 107 Ill. App. 3d
985, 989-90, 438 N.E.2d 614, 618 (1982).
103. See, e.g., Bernard v. Hemisphere Hotel Management, Inc., 16 Mass. App.
Ct. 261, -, 450 N.E.2d 1084, 1086, appeal denied, 390 Mass. 1102, 454 N.E.2d
1276 (1983).
104. 103 Ill. App. 3d 911, 431 N.E.2d 1299 (1982).
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obtained an architect's report on the house before suit was brought, but the
parties could not agree on what the report meant. The court stated that the
arbitration clause was broad enough to cover the dispute presented because it
concerned the quality of the material or workmanship; however, the court
found the architect's initial report insufficient to resolve the dispute."0 5
In Board of Education v. Ballweber,1" the board sought a declaratory
judgment that certain matters were not arbitrable in a dispute with a teacher's
association. The collective bargaining agreement contained a sick leave policy
and established a grievance procedure that permitted arbitration as a final
method of settling disputes. The board adopted a different sick-leave policy.
The court found arbitrable the dispute over which sick-leave policy was in
effect."' While recognizing that some management decisions are not subject
to arbitration, the court limited the class of nonarbitrable issues to those spe-
cifically established by statute.1"8
In Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. Ragnar Benson, Inc.,"°9 a sub-
contractor sued a general contractor for wrongfully rejecting claims made
under the dispute resolution provision. The contract provided that all disputes
concerning questions of fact were to be initially decided by the general con-
tractor. The subcontractor could appeal decisions of the general contractor to
the owner, whose decision was final and conclusive. The clause also provided
that a dispute would be settled by arbitration if the owner did not have "juris-
diction" over the dispute."' During construction, the subcontractor submitted
three claims, all of which were rejected by the general contractor and the
owner. When the subcontractor later filed suit on the same claims against the
general contractor and owner, the trial court dismissed the subcontractor's
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.1
The first claim involved a dispute over whether the owner was liable for
loss of material on the job site by theft. Reasoning that the owner could not be
the judge of his own liability, the court held that the owner had no jurisdiction
105. The architect's report confirmed the existence of some repairs by defendant
in the basement. While the report stated that no structural defects existed and that the
house looked like it was built in a workmanlike manner, it also noted that the walls
might not survive a "wet season." Id. at 914-15, 431 N.E.2d at 1302.
106. 105 Il1. App. 3d 412, 434 N.E.2d 448 (1982).
107. Id. at 416-17, 434 N.E.2d at 452.
108. Id. at 417-18, 434 N.E.2d at 453. The court found that by including the
sick leave policy in the collective bargaining agreement, the board was incorporating a
permissible decision into the contract, and was bound by that decision for the duration
of the contract. The court also held that the board's decision to reduce teachers' sala-
ries after shortening the school year was subject to arbitration because arbitration did
not amount to an impermissible delegation of the board's authority to set the length of
the school year. Id.
109. 111 Ill. App. 3d 855, 444 N.E.2d 726 (1982).
110. Id. at 859-60, 444 N.E.2d at 727.
111. Id. at 857, 444 N.E.2d at 728.
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over the first claim and the dispute was arbitrable."' The second claim in-
volved an expense the subcontractor incurred by using higher priced material
than contemplated by the bid. The court found that this dispute involved inter-
pretation of the contract, a question of law. The arbitration clause was limited
to questions of fact. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the subcon-
tractor's complaint on that issue. 1 The third issue concerned an extra ex-
pense the subcontractor incurred when installing certain fixtures. The court
held that this was a question of fact within the scope of the arbitration clause
and that the owner's decision was final.1 4
In Myers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"'s the plain-
tiffs sought to recover uninsured motorist benefits. The policy provided for ar-
bitration of disputes as to the liability of the uninsured motorist or the amount
of damages. The plaintiff moved to compel arbitration. The court stated that
coverage disputes should be submitted to arbitration if it is "reasonably debat-
able" whether the dispute is included in the arbitration clause.11
Nevertherless, the court noted that where the question of coverage goes not to
the merits of the claim, but to whether a claim exists, an arbitration clause
must be "quite broad" to encompass arbitrability of coverage.'" Where insur-
ance coverage is conditioned on establishing certain facts, the facts should be
resolved by the trial court. If the conditions are not met, the policy does not
provide coverage, and arbitration is not authorized. In effect, the court carved
out a specific exception for automobile insurance from the "reasonably debata-
ble" standard. The appellate court ultimately held that the uninsured motorist
coverage did not apply; therefore, there was nothing to arbitrate."'
In Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd."' the issue was the arbitrability of a
covenant not to compete contained in an employment contract. The contract
called for arbitration of all disputes arising under the contract. The physician
resisted arbitration on several theories, including lack of consideration for the
covenant not to compete. The court vacated an award in favor of the clinic,
holding that the issue of lack of consideration was not within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.12 0 Under Minnesota's equivalent of section 1 of the
UAA, arbitration agreements are enforceable except where legal or equitable
grounds exist to revoke the contract.' 2' Since an allegation of lack of consider-
ation supporting the arbitration clause, like a claim of fraud, affects the agree-
ment to arbitrate, it should be determined by a court before arbitration is
112. Id. at 864-65, 444 N.E.2d at 731.
113. Id. at 864-65, 444 N.E.2d at 732.
114. Id. at 863, 444 N.E.2d at 731.
115. 336 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1983).
116. Id. at 290-91.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 291-92.
119. 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983).
120. Id. at 629-30.
121. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.08 (1982).
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compelled. " '
The Colorado Supreme Court faced the issue of the arbitrability of a pub-
lic collective bargaining agreement in City of Denver v. Denver Firefighters
Local No. 858.1" The union sought injunctive relief, claiming that the city
and county had breached their collective bargaining agreement by refusing to
arbitrate certain grievances. The arbitration clause covered only complaints
alleging a violation of an express provision of the agreement. The agreement
specifically excluded matters requiring a change in any terms or conditions of
employment as established in the agreement, and those not specifically covered
by any provisions of the agreement. The court drew a distinction between "in-
terest arbitration" and "grievance arbitration. ' 12 4 It held that a provision for
grievance arbitration must be limited to disputes arising under express provi-
sions of the collective bargaining agreement and must not involve the delega-
tion of discretion to the arbitrator over any matter reserved to the discretion of
management under the agreement. Because the language of the instant agree-
ment was interpreted as leaving the dispute in question to management discre-
tion, the court vacated the arbitrator's award.'."
In Barber-Greene Co. v. Zeco Co.,"$ plaintiff sued to terminate a dealer-
ship agreement with defendant-debtor, which was involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Defendant counterclaimed, and plaintiff moved to dismiss the
counterclaim or to compel arbitration. The dealership agreement contained a
clause providing for arbitration of "any controversy or claims arising out of or
relating to this contract, or breach thereof."'1 27 The bankruptcy court com-
122. 334 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. 1982).
123. 663 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1983) (en banc).
124. Id. at 1038. Interest arbitration involves the terms and conditions of public
employment in a collective bargaining agreement. This has been found unconstitutional
in Colorado as an impermissible delegation of legislative power to a party not answera-
ble to the electorate. Id. at 1036-37 (contrasting grievance arbitration with interest
arbitration). Thus, a contract interpreted as including interest arbitration within its
scope is void. Grievance arbitration concerns factual findings by the arbitrator, who
interprets and applies specific contract provisions by reading the agreement as a whole
and discerning the intent of the parties. Grievance arbitration arises only after the
terms and conditions of employment have been established.
In general, a public employee may agree to submit any dispute to binding arbitra-
tion, other than a collective bargaining agreement. This is true even though an arbitra-
tor's award may require appropriation of public funds to pay any award that may be
made against the public employee. In approaching the issue of arbitrability, the arbi-
trator must initially decide whether the application of certain provisions of the agree-
ment will resolve the dispute. If so, the arbitrator must proceed to find the facts and
apply the contract. If the arbitrator exceeds his authority by going beyond the contract
terms and enacting new binding terms and conditions of employment, the dissatisfied
party may ask a court to vacate the award. Id. at 1039-40.
125. Id. at 1040.
126. 17 Bankr. 248 (D. Minn. 1982).
127. Id. at 249.
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pelled arbitration. 1 8
2. Forcing Arbitration of Issues Not Within the Agreement
A party usually may not be forced to arbitrate a dispute not covered by
the agreement. This principle was applied in Christmas v. Cimarron Realty
Co."' A real estate agent sued a broker to collect a commission allegedly due,
and the broker moved to compel arbitration. The contract incorporated by ref-
erence a trade provision calling for arbitration of disputes between realtors
from different firms. The court stated that the parties are only bound to arbi-
trate those issues which by clear language they have agreed to arbitrate with-
out extension by construction or implication.13" Because the controversy arose
when the parties were with the same firm, the dispute was not within the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate.
3. Nonparty Cannot Compel Party to Arbitrate
A person not a party to an arbitration agreement cannot compel arbitra-
tion. Likewise, a party may not force a nonparty to arbitrate a dispute. For
example, Board of Education v. Meridian Education Association""' involved a
dispute between substitute teachers and a school board over which of two sick-
leave policies was in effect. The teachers commenced arbitration pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found that the substitute
teachers were covered by the agreement because they were mentioned in it.
The appellate court reversed.' 82 Whether a person can compel arbitration is
determined by the language of the agreement giving rise to the arbitration. A
nonparty to an arbitration agreement cannot compel a party to arbitrate. Even
though the substitutes were mentioned in the agreement, they were not parties
to it and could not force the school board to arbitrate.133
In Greenleaf Engineering & Construction Co. v. Teradyne, Inc.'4 a de-
veloper had contracts with a construction company and an engineering firm,
both of which were run by the same person. The contract with the engineering
firm contained a broad arbitration clause, but there was no arbitration provi-
sion in the construction contract. The developer wanted to arbitrate a dispute
with both corporations. A Massachusetts appellate court held that absent
fraud, unconscionability, or ambiguous behavior requiring disregard of corpo-
rate entities, an arbitration clause in a contract with one corporation does not
128. Id. at 250.
129. 98 N.M. 330, 648 P.2d 788 (1982).
130. Id. at 332, 648 P.2d at 790 (quoting Flood v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 41
Ill. 91, 94, 242 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1968)).
131. 112 Il. App. 3d 558, 445 N.E.2d 864 (1983).
132. Id. at 562-63, 445 N.E.2d at 867.
133. Id.
134. 15 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 447 N.E.2d 9 (1983).
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apply to a second corporation, even though both are controlled by the same
person.135
In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Lucas,'36 clients of a broker
had two accounts, one of which had an arbitration clause. The clients sued the
firm on a claim arising exclusively out of a transaction involving the account
not covered by an arbitration clause. The firm moved to compel arbitration,
but the trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed on the
ground that the scope of the arbitration clause could not extend beyond the
contract that contained the clause.1 3 7
4. Agreement Applies to All Issues Arising After Execution
In Post Tensioned Engineering Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Associates,'8 8
the owner sued a contractor for breach of a construction contract. The agree-
ment provided for arbitration of all contract disputes involving the contractor
and the owner. The appellate court stated that a breach of contract does not
vitiate an arbitration clause, and a breach was an arbitrable event under the
arbitration clause involved. The court reasoned that if the basis of a claim that
the contract containing an arbitration clause is invalid lies in factual matters
that occurred after the making of the contract, the issue is arbitrable. 39 The
arbitration provision is a separate contract. Only an attack on the arbitration
provision itself would be outside the scope of the contract language. Since
there was no challenge to the contract as a whole or the arbitration clause, the
clause was valid. Therefore, all issues, including the breach of contract ques-
tion, were within the scope of the arbitration agreement . 40
5. Determining the Authority of the Arbitrator
Normally, parties can provide the arbitrator with the authority to decide
as many or few issues as they desire. An arbitrator may not ignore these limi-
tations unless the parties agree to submit additional issues for his decision.
In Arrowhead Public Service Union v. City of Duluth,'4 ' the court va-
cated an arbitration award reinstating employees laid off because of budget
cuts because it found that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in ordering the
reinstatement. The contract limited the arbitrator's authority to make deci-
sions to those based upon the terms of the contract. It expressly deprived the
arbitrator of the power to make decisions inconsistent with state law. The arbi-
135. Id. at __, 447 N.E.2d at 11.
136. 411 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
137. Id. at 1370.
138. 412 So. 2d 871, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition denied, 419 So. 2d 1197
(Fla. 1982), appeal filed, 429 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
139. Id. at 874.
140. Id. at 873 n.3.
141. 336 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 1983).
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trator had ordered the employees reinstated on the theory that the city had
relinquished the right to terminate unless it could show financial necessity or
lack of work. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that such a relinquish-
ment must be expressed in the contract in clear and unmistakable language
and found that the language of the contract did not meet that standard.142
In contrast to Arrowhead, a Colorado appellate court held in Red Carpet
Armory Realty Co. v. Golden West Realty,48 that an arbitration panel did
not exceed its powers. The plaintiff charged that the panel had exceeded its
powers by awarding an amount not requested by the parties. The arbitration
agreement provided that both parties would "abide absolutely by the award
and findings of the arbitrators." 44 The court held that the arbitrators' decision
was within the scope of the agreement."1"
In Cabus v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 46 an insurer sought to have an
award vacated because the arbitrator had allowed stacking of uninsured mo-
torist policies. Although not required by the policies, the parties agreed to sub-
mit the "stacking" issue to arbitration. After the arbitration hearing, but
before the award, the insurer attempted to withdraw that issue. The arbitrator
refused to withdraw the issue and gave an award to the insured. The court
stated that the parties may expand the powers of an arbitrator under a con-
tract for arbitration by mutual consent and that the new agreement is binding
on both parties.1 41 Once submitted, an issue remains with the arbitrator unless
the parties mutually agree to withdraw it. 48
In Lynch v. Three Ponds Co., 4' an agreement among joint venturers al-
lowed the managing partner to borrow funds at a 25% interest rate. One mem-
ber sought arbitration against three other members, claiming that the agree-
ment was void because the interest rate was commercially unreasonable. The
joint venture agreement contained a provision for formal arbitration of irrec-
oncilable differences between members, and incorporated the rules of the
AAA. The arbitrator first classified the funds, and then ruled in plaintiff's
favor on the interest issue. The arbitrator's decision was challenged by defen-
dants as exceeding the scope of the issues submitted by the parties. The court
agreed, finding that the part of the arbitrator's decision dealing with the clas-
sification of the funds was void. The court reasoned that the arbitrator's juris-
diction to make an award was limited to those issues which were expressly
submitted to him for determination by the parties."50
142. Id. at 71-72.
143. 644 P.2d 93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
144. Id. at 94.
145. Id.
146. 656 P.2d 54 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
147. Id. at 55.
148. Id. at 56.
149. 656 P.2d 51 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
150. Id. at 53.
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6. Effect of Expiration of the Agreement to Arbitrate
In Lehman v. Eugene Matansky & Associates, Inc.,"' the owners of a
mobile-home park sought to enjoin defendant real estate broker from arbitrat-
ing his claim for a commission. The parties' agreement contained a generic
arbitration clause1 52 and a fixed termination date. The owners sent a termina-
tion notice as the contract required. After the termination date of the contract,
the broker communicated to the owners an offer from a prospective purchaser,
which became the basis for the broker's claim for commission. The broker
contended that the contract had not been terminated. The appellate court
found that the contract was completely terminated prior to the offer on which
the broker based his claim. The court held that a party may not rely on an
arbitration clause in an expired contract to force arbitration of a claim arising
after the contract's expiration. 53
7. Interpretation of Arbitration Rules
In Bernard v. Hemisphere Hotel Management, Inc., 1 the contract re-
quired that all disputes arising under the contract be submitted to arbitration
in accordance with the rules of the AAA. A dispute arose during arbitration
that required interpretation of the rules. Before the AAA rendered a decision
on the issue, the plaintiff secured an order from the trial court requiring arbi-
tration to continue. The appellate court reversed, stating that if parties to a
contract agree to submit all of their disputes to arbitration, the power of adju-
dication rests with the arbitrators, and the scope of the judicial role is narrow.
The court held that the interpretation of arbitration rules was within the scope
of the agreement and was solely for the arbitrators to determine. 5
8. Arbitrability Involving Government Entities
Government units may enter into binding arbitration agreements in the
absence of a statutory prohibition. In Bingham County Commission v. Inter-
state Electric Co.,'" the commission contracted with IEC for electrical work.
A delay occurred, and IEC sought compensation for cost overruns and submit-
ted the claim to arbitration. The county filed a motion to vacate an award in
favor of IEC, asserting that claims against the county could not be arbitrated.
151. 107 Ill. App. 3d 985, 438 N.E.2d 614 (1982).
152. The clause stated, "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment thereon may be en-
tered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." Id. at 987, 438 N.E.2d at 616.
153. Id. at 989-90, 438 N.E.2d at 618.
154. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 450 N.E.2d 1084, appeal denied, 390 Mass. 1102,
454 N.E.2d 1276 (1983).
155. Id. at -, 450 N.E.2d at 1085.
156. 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983).
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The trial court vacated the award, relying on an Indiana case, Myers v. Gib-
son.1 7 The Idaho Supreme Court refused to accept the Myers rationale, and
ruled that counties have implied power to submit a claim to binding arbitra-
tion unless prohibited from doing so by statute. Because Idaho had no applica-
ble statutory prohibition, the award was reinstated.""
Most questions concerning the scope of contract language are determined
by analyzing the agreement to determine whether the parties intended for the
dispute to trigger arbitration. There is some disagreement about how to treat
issues that may affect the validity of the underlying contract. Some states only
require that it appear "reasonably debatable" from the nature of the claim
and the language of the arbitration clause that the issue is within the scope of
the agreement. In those states, a claim is first subject to arbitration and a
dissatisfied party may ask a court to vacate the award. 15 Other states hold
that the validity of the underlying contract is initially decided by the court. If
the contract is invalid arbitration cannot be compelled.16 0
B. Severability of Claims
The issue of severability arises when a claim submitted is not arbitrable.
The question is whether the arbitrable issue can be heard separately by the
arbitrator or must be heard by the court. To promote judicial economy and to
give the parties the benefit of their bargain to the extent possible, claims are
usually severed."'
In Himmelstein v. Valenti Development Corp.,162 the court held that a
claim of pre-contract tortious misrepresentation was not subject to arbitration.
It severed that claim from the other claims that were remanded to the arbitra-
tor for his decision."'
In City of Hot Springs v. Gunderson's, Inc.,"" the city sued an architec-
tural firm and a contractor for negligence and breach of contract in the design
and construction of a golf course. The contractor's contract contained an arbi-
tration clause, but the architect's contract did not. The trial court denied the
157. 147 Ind. 452, 46 N.E. 914 (1897). In Myers, a taxpayer sought to overturn
an arbitration award in favor of the board of county commissioners. The taxpayer ar-
gued that the commission lacked power to submit a claim to binding arbitration. The
Indiana Supreme Court ruled for the taxpayer and vacated the award.
158. 105 Idaho at -, 665 P.2d at 1050-51.
159. See, e.g., Myers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 288, 290-
91 (Minn. 1983).
160. See, e.g., Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn.
1983).
161. See, e.g., City of Hot Springs v. Gunderson's, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 8, 11 (S.D.
1982).
162. 103 Ill. App. 3d 911, 431 N.E.2d 1299 (1982).
163. Id. at 91-15, 431 N.E.2d at 1302.
164. 322 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1982).
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contractor's motion to compel arbitration because of the likelihood that multi-
ple suits would result if the motion was granted. The court of appeals held
that denial of the motion was improper because a court must consider the
propriety of severing claims before denying arbitration on the ground that
multiple suits might result in different forums. 1'
In Lynch v. Three Ponds Co.,'" part of an arbitrator's award was void
because it concerned an issue that was not arbitrable. The court held that the
part of the award concerning matters covered by the arbitration agreement
was severable from the void portion and could not be set aside absent a show-
ing of other grounds to vacate. 1 7
In Barber-Greene v. Zeco. Co.,'"s the court held that the question whether
there was appropriate cause to terminate a dealership agreement was arbitra-
ble. The court ordered the claim severed because the law favors arbitration
and there was no compelling reason to retain the claim."'
C. Arbitrability of Specific Claims
One jurisdiction has recently implied that issues affecting the public inter-
est may not be arbitrable.'" In Greenleaf Engineering & Construction Co. v.
Teradyne, Inc., 71 a construction company brought suit against a developer to
recover for services rendered on a contract. The developer counterclaimed and
filed a third-party claim against an engineering firm for engaging in unfair
and deceptive trade practices. The developer appealed from an order compel-
ling all the parties to arbitrate on the ground that the strong public interest in
litigating deceptive trade practice claims made arbitration inappropriate. The
court acknowledged the possibility that a sufficient public interest could render
an issue nonarbitrable.17 Nevertheless, it found that the private commercial
dispute involved in the instant case did not present any issues implicating any
strong public policy. 178
Arbitration can be improper when it involves nondelegable legislative du-
ties. In City of Denver v. Denver Firefighters Local No. 858,17' the parties
executed a collective bargaining agreement. Arbitration was the final step in
the grievance procedure. The city refused to arbitrate an employer discrimina-
tion claim. The Colorado Supreme Court ordered binding arbitration after it
165. Id. at 11.
166. 656 P.2d 51 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
167. Id. at 54.
168. 17 Bankr. 248 (D. Minn. 1982).
169. Id. at 250.
170. The court compelled arbitration, but it acknowledged that a sufficient public
interest could make an issue nonarbitrable. Id.
171. 15 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 447 N.E.2d 9 (1983).
172. Id. at 447 N.E.2d at 12.
173. Id. at .. _, 447 N.E.2d at 12-13.
174. 663 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1983).
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categorized the union's claim as grievance arbitration. The court explained
that interest arbitration is arbitration occurring during negotiations leading to
the formation of a contract. Grievance arbitration arises under the terms of an
existing collective bargaining agreement. The court invalidated interest arbi-
tration as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority under the Col-
orado state constitution because it allows the arbitrator to substitute his judg-
ment on matters entrusted only to public officials. 17 ' The court upheld
grievance arbitration as a proper judicial function of an arbitrator under Colo-
rado constitutional principles. 176
D. Proper Forum for Determining Arbitrability
The arbitration agreement generally controls which forum should deter-
mine arbitrability. Under the UAA, the question of arbitrability arises when
one of the parties denies that it has agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute.
Absent an agreement to the contrary, the general rule is that the determina-
tion of whether a particular dispute is arbitrable is a legal question for the
court 1  rather than the arbitrator.178 Although recent decisions adhere to this
general principle, one case illustrates how an arbitration agreement may result
in arbitrability being determined by the arbitrator even if the parties have not
so agreed.179
In Lehman v. Eugene Matansky & Associates,'" the parties entered into
a brokerage contract containing an arbitration clause. The contract required
the plaintiff to notify the defendant before terminating the agreement. Four
months after plaintiff gave defendant notice, the defendant sought to arbitrate
a contract claim against the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued to enjoin arbitration,
arguing that the brokerage contract had been properly terminated. The trial
court enjoined arbitration, and the appellate court affirmed.' " It reasoned that
under the UAA, the trial court determines arbitrability when one of the par-
175. Id. at 1037-38.
176. Id. at 1040.
177. UAA § 2. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
570-71 (1960).
178. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arbitration and Award § 15 (1962). The strong presumption
in favor of the court's determination of arbitrability may be rebutted by inserting the
following clause:
The parties agree that in the event a dispute arises as to whether or not any
claim, dispute, or controversy arising under the terms of this contract is sub-
ject to the arbitration provision set forth herein the matter shall be decided by
arbitration in the same manner and with the same effect as all other contro-
versies arising hereunder.
2 AM. JuR. LEGAL FORMs 2D § 23.44 (1971).
179. Hiller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 Pa. Super. 149, 446 A.2d 273 (1982).
180. 107 Ill. App. 3d 985, 438 N.E.2d 614 (1982).
181. Id. at 991-92, 438 N.E.2d at 619-20.
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ties denies that it has agreed to arbitrate." 2 Therefore, the issue was properly
decided by the trial court. 8
In Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. Rangar Benson, Inc.," another
court agreed that the contractual nature of arbitration makes the determina-
tion of arbitrability a decision for the courts. A subcontractor sued his general
contractor on three separate claims for additional payment. The contract con-
tained a mechanism for dispute resolution.' 8 5 The general contractor argued
that the arbitration clause precluded litigation of the subcontractor's claims.
The trial court found these claims to be arbitrable and dismissed the lawsuit.
Ironically, the general contractor argued on appeal that arbitrability initally
should be determined by the arbitrator. The appellate court held that the trial
court must determine the arbitrability of the claims in the first instance.'"
In Arrowhead Public Service Union v. City of Duluth,18 7 the issue was
whether the city had violated the labor arbitration clause of a collective bar-
gaining agreement when it laid off one of its employees because of budget
cuts. The arbitrator ruled that the dispute was arbitrable and that the city
violated the agreement because the city failed to show that the layoffs were
motivated by financial necessity. The trial court vacated the award because
the arbitrator exceeded his authority in determining the arbitrability of the
dispute. The appellate court affirmed because the arbitrability of employee
grievance disputes must be judicially determined.'88
Hiller v. Allstate Insurance Co.'89 illustrates how an arbitration agree-
ment may ultimately result in an arbitrator determining arbitrability in spite
of the general rule. In Hiller, the arbitration clause contained a limitation on
the amount awardable through arbitration for uninsured motorist coverage. 9
182. Id. at 988, 438 N.E.2d at 617; see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 102 (Smith-
Hurd 1975) (section identical to U.A.A. § 2).
183. Lehman, 107 I11. App. 3d at 988, 438 N.E.2d at 617.
184. 111 I11. App. 3d 855, 444 N.E.2d 726 (1982).
185. The phrase "mechanism for dispute resolution" is used here to distinguish
this agreement from those utilizing more ordinary procedures for binding arbitration.
This agreement provided in part: "All disputes concerning questions of fact, arising
under the Agreement, shall be decided by the Contractor subject to written appeal by
the Subcontractor within seven (7) days to the Contractor, who in turn will submit said
appeal to the owner or his representative, whose decision shall be final and conclusive
upon the parties thereto." Id. at 858, 444 N.E.2d at 728.
186. Id. at 861, 444 N.E.2d at 730. (quoting United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1960)). "[A] court must always inquire, when a party
seeks to invoke its aid to force a reluctant party to the arbitration table, whether the
parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute. In this sense, the question of
whether a dispute is 'arbitrable' is inescapably for the court."
187. 336 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 1983).
188. Id. at 70.
189. 300 Pa. Super. 149, 446 A.2d 273 (1982).
190. The arbitration clause stated:
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The arbitrators made an award in excess of the policy limit. 1 ' The trial court
vacated the award as beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement. The ap-
pellate court followed the principle that arbitrability is a question for the court
and affirmed."" The court recognized, however, that the language of the arbi-
tration clause made the arbitrability of plaintiff's claim depend on the value
the arbitrators placed on the claim.1 98 If the arbitrators determined the value
of the claim to be within the limits of the agreement, then the claim would be
arbitrable. The claim could not be arbitrable if the arbitrators decided that its
value exceeded the policy limits.
Few recent cases have addressed the question of which forum, arbitration
or litigation, should determine arbitrability. The decisions demonstrate that
courts presume the parties intended for courts to determine arbitrability in the
absence of an express agreement to the contrary. Parties may avoid the effect
of the general rule by consent, so attorneys should make the agreement reflect
any preference for having the arbitrator determine arbitrability of a dispute in
order to rebut the normal presumption.
V. PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
A. Staying Court Proceedings
When an arbitrable issue is the subject matter of a pending lawsuit, the
suit must be stayed upon a showing that arbitration has been ordered or that
an application for an order to arbitrate has been made."" If the arbitrable
issue is severable from the other issues in the suit, the stay may be applied to
the litigation of that issue only. If the demand for arbitration is directed to the
trial court,"'5 the court must include in its order to arbitrate a stay of the
When we arbitrate, the decision in writing will be binding up to the lim-
its required under the Financial Responsibility law of Pennsylvania, and may
be entered as a judgment in a proper court. When an award exceeds those
limits, either party has a right to trial on all issues in a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Id. at 149, 446 A.2d at 274.
191. The arbitrators awarded $30,000, the maximum amount recoverable under
the policy. Id. That award exceeded the $15,000 per person requirement of the Finan-
cial Responsibility law. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1747 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
192. Hiller, 300 Pa. Super. at 149, 446 A.2d at 274.
193. Id.
194. UAA § 2(d) states:
Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall
be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefore has been
made under this section or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with
respect thereto only. When the application is made in such action or proceed-
ing, the order for arbitration shall include such stay.
195. UAA § 16.
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court proceedings. 1'"
Courts generally encourage enforcement of executory arbitration agree-
ments 197 and provide for expeditious, inexpensive dispute resolution without
judicial involvement. 198 Litigation may be stayed even though the parties have
not executed an agreement to arbitrate when the need for litigation may be
obviated by the results of other, related arbitration.'"
Some disputes can be litigated without first submitting them to arbitra-
tion. A recent Massachusetts case held that a party asserting a claim under a
statute prohibiting unfair trade practices may proceed with his lawsuit without
submitting the claim to arbitration, even though the contract from which the
dispute arose contained an arbitration clause.2 "
The policy favoring enforcement of executory arbitration agreements con-
trolled the decision in Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities,
Inc °. 2 0 The court held that the prospect of inconsistent judgments in arbitra-
tion and related litigation with a third-party is not a compelling reason to stay
arbitration.20 2 The plaintiff-contractor agreed to build a community center for
defendant-owner, and the plaintiff subcontracted the excavation work. Both
contracts contained arbitration clauses. The plaintiff later demanded that de-
fendant pay the balance due under the contract. The defendant refused be-
cause it claimed the construction work was faulty. When the plaintiff invoked
the arbitration clause in its contract, defendant moved to stay arbitration and
sued the plaintiff, its surety, and the architect. The trial court refused to order
arbitration.20 3 The defendant's contract with the architect did not contain an
arbitration clause. It argued on appeal that forcing it to arbitrate with the
plaintiff and litigate with the architect might result in inconsistent judg-
mentsY2' The appellate court held that arbitration should have been com-
pelled.205 First, the policy favoring arbitration would be undermined if the
196. Id. § 2(d).
197. Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 450 A.2d 1304,
1312 (Md. 1982).
198. Comment, The Uniform Arbitration Act in Missouri, 46 Mo. L. REv. 627,
630 (1981).
199. Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assocs., 429 So. 2d 1212
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
200. Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 385 Mass. 813, 434
N.E.2d 611 (1982).
201. 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (Md. 1982).
202. Id. at 455-60, 450 A.2d at 1311-12.
203. Id. at 445-47, 450 A.2d at 1305-06.
204. Id. at 445, 450 A.2d at 1305-06.
205. The court recognized that there is a split of authority on this issue, citing
cases where the opposite result was reached. County of Jefferson v. Barton-Douglas
Contractors, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa 1979); Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v. Adolfson
& Peterson Inc., 308 Minn. 20, 240 N.W.2d 551 (1976); J.F. Inc. v. Vicik, 99 Ill. App.
3d 815, 426 N.E.2d 257 (1981). The prospect of duplicative proceedings with the pO-
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agreement were not enforced.' 0° Second, the UAA contemplates the possibility
of multiple proceedings.20 7 Under UAA section 2(d), litigation involving an
issue subject to arbitration may be stayed with respect to that issue alone if
the issue is severable. 0 8 The court recognized that the evidence introduced at
both proceedings would be duplicative and that the expense involved in con-
ducting dual proceedings would probably exceed the cost of determining the
merits of all the parties' claims in either arbitration or litigation. Nevertheless,
when a court is asked to stay arbitration the sole issue is whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists. 09 Matters of efficiency are not within the judge's
discretion. Third, it would be unfair to require a party to an arbitration agree-
ment to litigate when his opponent's voluntary action of signing another con-
tract not containing an arbitration agreement created the possibility of incon-
sistent results. 10
In Post Tensioned Engineering Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Associates,1 '
court proceedings between parties who had not executed an arbitration agree-
ment were stayed pending the outcome of arbitration, which might have obvi-
ated the need for litigation. Fairways filed suit against a general contractor,
several subcontractors, and a design engineer, alleging negligence in the con-
struction and design of an office building. Only Fairways' contract with the
general contractor contained an arbitration clause. The trial court refused to
stay Fairways' suit even though the dispute was arbitrable.'
The appellate court determined that the dispute between Fairways and all
of the contractors was arbitrable. The court not only stayed the litigation in-
volving the general contractor, but also the litigation involving subcontractors
with whom Fairways had never agreed to arbitrate. " The court based its
holding on the doctrine of respondeat superior. If the arbitrator found that the
general contractor was not negligent, further litigation would be unneces-
sary.' 1 ' The court affirmed the order lifting the stay of the litigation involving
the design engineer. His negligence, if any, was deemed independent of the
negligence of the contractor and subcontractors by the court and was thus
severable from the arbitrable issue of the contractors' negligence. 16
In Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc.,21 s the court held that
tential for inconsistent results and the obvious inefficiency of dual adjudications under-
pin these courts' decisions.
206. Frank, 294 Md. at 457, 450 A.2d at 1311.
207. Id.
208. UAA § 2(d).
209. Id. §§ 2(a), (b).
210. Frank, 294 Md. at 458-59, 450 A.2d at 1311-12.
211. 429 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
212. Id. at 1215.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1214.
215. Id.
216. 385 Mass. 813, 434 N.E.2d 611 (1982).
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court proceedings predicated on an unfair trade practices claim need not be
stayed when the claim is submitted to arbitration. 1 7 The parties executed a
construction contract that contained an arbitration clause. Hannon sued
Aquatech under a Massachusetts unfair trade practice statute.'1 6 The trial
court stayed Hannon's claim. The appellate court held that the unfair trade
practices claim was not arbitrable' 19 because the statute allows a person alleg-
ing injury from an unfair trade practice to bring his action without initiating,
pursuing, or exhausting "any remedy established by any regulation, adminis-
trative procedure, local, state, or federal law or statute or the common law.""..°
The court reasoned that the stay was improper"" because arbitration is a stat-
utory remedy"' and unfair trade practices actions can be stayed only under
limited circumstances not present in Hannon's case."1
8
Arbitration is generally viewed as a quick, inexpensive method of settling
a dispute. In the course of day-to-day business dealings, for example, disagree-
ments may arise as to the duties of parties to a contract or the proper interpre-
tation to be given to a contract. Where parties have agreed in advance to
submit such disputes to arbitration, their agreement is to be given full effect
absent fraud, duress, or any of the other contract defenses. The Hannon court
looked beyond the express requirements of the UAA 2 4 to create an artificial,
statutory defense to arbitration. The court misperceived the purpose of arbi-
tration in so doing."25 This decision allows parties to escape from some arbitra-
tion agreements by classifying a particular contract breach as an unfair trade
practice. The courts in Frank and Fairways were forced to balance the policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements against the policy of promot-
ing efficiency in the administration of justice, policies which at times conflict.
In both cases, the courts were able to achieve results which minimized this
conflict to the extent possible under the UAA.
B. Compelling Arbitration
Section 2 of the UAA permits proceedings to compel or stay arbitra-
tion. 2 6 Any party to an arbitration agreement may apply for an order to com-
pel arbitration. If the other party denies that there is an .agreement, the court
217. Id. at - , 434 N.E.2d at 613.
218. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West Supp. 1983-84).
219. Hannon, 385 Mass. at - , 434 N.E.2d at 618.
220. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(7) (West Supp. 1983-84).
221. Hannon, 385 Mass. at - , 434 N.E.2d at 613.
222. Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 618-19.
223. Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 619.
224. UAA § 1; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 251, § 1 (West Supp. 1983-84).
225. "Arbitration is a dispute settlement device; it is not a remedy." Northern
Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1982).
226. See UAA § 2(a), (b).
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decides the issue.'2 A court must compel arbitration if a valid arbitration
agreement exists. 28 Because arbitration is a contractual remedy, the contract
determines the limitations, conditions, and restrictions on arbitration. 2 9
If an arbitration agreement between the parties exists, the UAA strongly
favors enforcing the agreement. 80 Agreements to resolve disputes extra-judi-
cially are favored by courts because arbitration settles disputes faster and
more economically than judicial action.231 Section 2 of the UAA provides a
quick and efficient means of compelling parties to carry out their arbitration
agreements.
While arbitration is seen as a forum for settling differences and not as a
remedy in itself, 2 ' courts have imposed certain requirements and limitations
upon its use. First, an adequate demand for arbitration must be made. If no
demand is made, arbitration will not be compelled even if an arbitration
agreement exists. 3 3 Second, only parties to an arbitration agreement may ap-
ply for an order compelling arbitration. Even if a third-party is mentioned in
the agreement and would benefit by arbitration, he has no right to compel
arbitration."' Third, there must be an arbitration clause in the contract be-
tween the parties.2 85 Thus, a court will not order one corporation to arbitrate a
dispute with a person merely because another corporation having the same
president has an arbitration clause in its contract with the same person.2 6
In City of Hot Springs v. Gunderson's, Inc.,2 37 the court held that the
UAA limits judicial review of motions to compel arbitration to three fac-
tors: (1) whether an agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether the defendant
has a duty to arbitrate under the agreement; and (3) whether the defendant
has breached this duty."" The parties executed a construction contract that
contained several arbitration provisions. The city also entered into an architec-
227. See UAA § 2(a).
228. Id.
229. Christmas v. Cimarron Realty Co., 98 N.M. 330, 332, 648 P.2d 788, 790
(1982).
230. City of Hot Springs v. Gunderson's, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 8, 10 (S.D. 1982).
231. E.g., Rhine v. Union Carbide Corp., 343 F.2d 12, 16 (6th Cir. 1965); Ar-
rieta v. Volkswagen Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 918, 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
232. Northern Il. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir.
1982).
233. Hanslin Builders, Inc. v. Britt Dev. Corp., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 319,
445 N.E.2d 188, 190 (1983).
234. Board of Educ. v. Meridian Educ. Ass'n, 112 I11. App. 3d 558, 562, 445
N.E.2d 864, 867 (1983).
235. UAA § 2(a).
236. Greenleaf Eng'g & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Teradyne, Inc., 15 Mass. Apn. Ct.
571, -, 447 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1983).
237. 322 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1982).
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tural contract with Phelps-Benz, but this agreement did not provide for arbi-
tration. 39 The city sued both Gunderson's and Phelps-Benz for negligent con-
struction and design. The trial court refused to compel arbitration. The
appellate court reversed because the trial court based its decision on its finding
that the risk of adverse consequences from multiple suits in different forums
was too great."0 This went beyond the three permissible considerations and
was contrary to the strong policy favoring the arbitration of disputes.2"
In Hanslin Builders, Inc. v. Britt Development Corp.,"' the court held
that an adequate demand for arbitration must be made before a trial court
may dismiss an action or stay the proceeding." Plaintiff-builder and defen-
dant-developer executed a construction contract containing an arbitration
clause.'" The defendant wrote to the plaintiff advising that payment would
not be made because the houses were improperly constructed. Although the
final sentence of the letter nominated an individual to arbitrate the disputes,
the defendant never demanded arbitration. The plaintiff commenced an action
to collect payment, and the trial court refused to stay the proceeding. The
appellate court held that the request for a stay was properly denied 45 because
arbitration was never expressly demanded 2' " and because the defendant never
sought an order to compel arbitration under section 2(a) of the Massachusetts
Arbitration Act." 7 There was nothing in the record to indicate that the court
or the parties treated the motion to stay as a motion to compel arbitration.248
In Board of Education v. Meridian Education Association,249 the court
applied the rule that a nonparty cannot compel arbitration.25 0 Following a
teachers' strike, the school district and the Meridian Education Association
239. Id. at 9.
240. Id. at 11.
241. Id. at 10.
242. 15 Mass. App. Ct. 319, 445 N.E.2d 188 (1983).
243. Id. at , 445 N.E.2d at 190.
244. Id. at _,, 445 N.E.2d at 189.
245. Id.
246. Id. The court stated that the last sentence in the defendant's letter was not
an express demand.
247. Id. at -, 445 N.E.2d at 190. The Massachusetts statute provides that:
A party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of another to proceed to arbi-
tration under an agreement described in section one may apply to the Supe-
rior Court for an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration. If the
opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court
shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall,
if it finds for the applicant, order arbitration; otherwise, the application shall
be denied.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2(a) (West Supp. 1983-84). This is substantively
the same as U.A.A. § 2.
248. Hanslin, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at -, 445 N.E.2d at 190.
249. 112 I11. App. 3d 558, 445 N.E.2d 864 (1983).
250. Id. at 562, 445 N.E.2d at 867.
[Vol. 1984236
30
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1984, Iss.  [1984], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1984/iss/13
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
(MEA) executed a collective bargaining agreement which included a non-re-
prisal clause251 and a recognition clause. 51 The agreement provided for a
grievance procedure culminating in arbitration.'' The MEA filed a grievance
concerning substitute teachers based on the non-reprisal clause. The arbitrator
decided that although substitute teachers were not covered by the recognition
clause, they were entitled to arbitrate.2 The trial court affirmed the order
compelling arbitration on the theory that the substitute teachers were third-
party beneficiaries of the non-reprisal clause.""
The appellate court held that the substitute teachers could not force arbi-
tration because they were not parties to nor covered by the collective bargain-
ing agreement.'5 6 In response to the argument that the MEA, representing the
substitutes, was a party to the agreement, the court stated that the MEA
could not compel arbitration of grievances pertaining to members who were
not specifically covered by the collective bargaining agreement. To allow the
MEA to compel arbitration would endorse a fiction by allowing the substitutes
to do what they could not do in their own names.'57 Thus, even though the
substitutes were mentioned in the non-reprisal clause as "other parties," they
were not considered parties to the agreement.
In Greenleaf Engineering & Construction Co. v. Teradyne, Inc.,2" the
court held that two corporations should be treated separately for the purpose
of compelling arbitration, even though the two corporations had the same pres-
ident.' 59 The record indicated that plaintiff had dealt sufficiently with the two
corporations as separate entities to permit the trial judge to treat the corpora-
251. Id. at 559-60, 445 N.E.2d at 865. The non-reprisal clause provided that
neither party "shall cause reprisals or recriminations against the other party nor
against individual employees, students, or other parties who might be subject to same
as a result of the work stoppage." Id.
252. Id. at 560, 445 N.E.2d at 865. The MEA was recognized by the district "as
the exclusive and sole negotiation agent for all regularly employed full-time certificated
teaching personnel, except the Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent, Principals,
and other central office professional staff." Id.
253. Id. If a grievance was not resolved, it would be submitted to arbitration.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 562-63, 445 N.E.2d at 867.
257. Id. at 563, 445 N.E.2d at 867-868. The court speculated that the substitute
teachers might have a cause of action for breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries
under the non-reprisal clause, but it did not decide the issue. Id.
258. 15 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 447 N.E.2d 9 (1983).
259. Id. at __, 447 N.E.2d at 11. Plaintiff-builder's contract with corporation
A contained an arbitration clause, but his contract with corporation B did not. Id. at
-, 447 N.E.2d at 10. Both corporations had the same president. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's ruling that compelled arbitration as to corporation A, but
refused to compel arbitration as to corporation B. Id. at -, 447 N.E.2d at 11. The
plaintiff argued that the relationship among the president and the two corporations was
close and that the president's influence in the affairs of both corporations was pervasive.
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tions separately with respect to arbitration.'"
In Christmas v. Cimarron Realty Co.,261 the court relied on the principle
that the arbitration agreement determines whether the parties must arbitrate.
The plaintiff, a realtor, alleged that the defendant, her former employer, owed
her commission fees. The defendant moved to compel arbitration under the
Realtor's Code of Ethics, which requires controversies arising from relation-
ship between realtors of different firms to be settled through arbitration. The
court applied the plain meaning of the Code and held that arbitration could
not be compelled because the dispute arose from a contractual relationship
between the parties when they were members of the same firm."" The court
reasoned that to compel the plaintiff to arbitrate would be tantamount to in-
serting a new clause into an otherwise unambiguous contract.2"
The decision in Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Local 879, Hotel Employees
Union26 was also based on contract considerations. Kodiak involved two arbi-
tration hearings. The first hearing occurred after the parties' arbitration agree-
ment had expired. Kodiak, after agreeing to submit to arbitration, was ordered
to reinstate an employee. After the employee was fired a second time, he again
demanded arbitration. Although Kodiak did not agree to participate in this
second hearing, the arbitrator conducted the hearing and entered an award
against Kodiak on the theory that he had continuing authority over the matter
because Kodiak failed to properly comply with the first order. The appellate
court reasoned that arbitration is a matter of contract and that a party cannot
be required to arbitrate any dispute which he has not agreed to submit to
arbitration. Thus, Kodiak was not bound by the second order because it was
not decided under an existing arbitration agreement.265
In Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy,"" plaintiff, Smith, contracted to perform ar-
chitectural services for the defendant, Cudahy. Smith moved to compel arbi-
tration of his dispute with Cudahy. The trial court granted the motion.
Cudahy appealed on the ground that the trial court's evidentiary hearing on
the matter was too restrictive. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the inquiry
under Idaho Code § 7-902(a)26 ' must be limited2s because a review of the
merits would frequently "emasculate the benefits of arbitration. 126 9
260. Id. at - , 447 N.E.2d at 11.
261. 98 N.M. 330, 648 P.2d 788 (1982).
262. Id. at 332, 648 P.2d at 790.
263. Id.
264. 641 P.2d 11 (Alaska 1982).
265. Id. at 13.
266. 104 Idaho 106, 656 P.2d 1359 (1983).
267. IDAHO CODE § 7-902(a) (1975). The language in subsection (a) is identical
to the language used in UAA § 2(a).
268. 104 Idaho at -, 656 P.2d at 1362.
269. Id. The dissent argued that arbitration should not be compelled for two
reasons. First, the arbitration agreement was inequitable and should be deemed invalid
under IDAHO CODE § 7-901 (1975). This statute states that arbitration agreements are
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In Post Tensioned Engineering v. Fairways Plaza,"° Fairways sued its
contractor, Commercial, who in turn moved to compel arbitration. The court
limited its review to determining whether a valid arbitration agreement ex-
isted.271 Fairways' sole objection to arbitration was that Commercial had
breached the contract. The court decided that the question whether the con-
tract was breached, although justiciable, is one which the arbitrator must de-
cide . 7 2 The court also held that the claim was not too complex for arbitra-
tion. 27 3 The strong policy favoring arbitration rendered untenable the
proposition that a party to an arbitration agreement may avoid his obligation
by joining nonparties as defendants in litigation.2 7
Similarly, in City of Pompano Beach v. Meiroff,"5 the court held that its
inquiry was limited when arbitration is sought to be compelled. Meiroff sought
arbitration of a wage dispute between himself and the city. The trial court
compelled arbitration and defined the main issue for the arbitrator to consider.
The appellate court held that the trial court properly compelled arbitration,
but that it exceeded its authority by defining the issue to be decided in
arbitration. 27
6
In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Lucas'277 Lucas had two
accounts with the brokerage firm. Only one account was governed by an arbi-
tration clause. Lucas sued Paine, Webber about matters concerning only the
other account. Paine, Webber moved to compel arbitration because of the
other account's arbitration provision, but the trial court denied this motion.
The appellate court recognized that to permit the parties to litigate at all when
one of the parties has a right to compel arbitration completely frustrates that
right.2 78 Nevertheless, the court held that the arbitration clause applied only to
"valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." Second, this complex lawsuit should be judicially re-
solved so all of the claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims could be contemporaneously
decided. This case originally involved not only Cudahy and Smith, but also Loomis,
Inc., the contractor who filed a mechanic's lien against Cudahy's house, and Ronald
Liese and Liese & Associates Ins., Inc., who issued a performance bond. In multi-party
actions involving multiple claims, the dissent argued that the goal of fast and inexpen-
sive dispute resolution is better served by the judicial remedy of joinder than by arbi-
tration. Loomis, 104 Idaho at -, 656 P.2d at 1376.
270. 412 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition denied, 419 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.
1982), appeal filed, ( Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
271. Id. at 873.
272. Id. at 874.
273. Fairways claimed that it had, and would later, sue others with whom it had
no arbitration agreement. Id.
274. 412 So. 2d at 875.
275. 410 So. 2d 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
276. Id. at 664.




et al.: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act Student Project
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
one account. The parties' rights to arbitrate are controlled by the terms of
their agreement, and only one of the two separate agreements permitted
arbitration.7 9
In Frontier Materials, Inc. v. City of Boulder'280 the court examined
whether an interlocutory order compelling arbitration is appealable. The trial
court ordered arbitration, and defendant appealed. The appellate court dis-
missed the appeal because Colorado law2O' does not specifically allow for ap-
peals of orders compelling arbitration . 82
Continental Insurance Co. v. HulP8 ' involved the application of a statute
designed to promote the efficient resolution of small claims.2 " The plaintiffs
sued to recover damages suffered in an automobile accident. The trial court
dismissed the suit because Nevada law required submission of the plaintiffs'
claim to arbitration.28 5 The appellate court held that while arbitration was
required, the dismissal was improper.286 The court agreed that Nevada law
precluded plaintiffs from proceeding to trial,28 7 but it decided that plaintiffs'
complaint should be viewed as a "refusal to arbitrate" which allows a court to
compel arbitration.2 8 8
The most common issues found in proceedings to compel arbitration are:
(1) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement; (2) whether the arbitration
agreement applies to the dispute; (3) what the proper scope of judicial inquiry
into the question of compelling arbitration should be; (4) whether a dispute
would be better handled within the courts because of its complexity; and (5)
whether a trial court's order compelling arbitration can be immediately ap-
pealed. In resolving these issues, courts are guided by two principles. First, the
questions are considered in light of the policies encouraging arbitration. Sec-
279. Id. at 1371.
280. 663 P.2d 1065 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
281. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-221 (Supp. 1982). This statute is identical to
UAA § 19.
282. 663 P.2d at 1066. In citing Sandefer v. District Court, 635 P.2d 547 (Colo.
1981), without comment, the court may have been implying that orders compelling
arbitration may be immediately reviewable by writ of mandamus.
283. 98 Nev. 542, 654 P.2d 1024 (1982).
284. NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.215(1) (1979) provides that,
[A]ll civil actions for damages for personal injury, death, or property
damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,
where the cause of action arises in the State of Nevada and the amount in
issue does not exceed $3000, shall be submitted to arbitration, in accordance
with the provisions of N.R.S. 38.015 and 38.205 inclusive.
285. Id. § 38.225 states that, "No cause of action specified in N.R.S. 38-215
shall be tried until there has been compliance with all provisions of N.R.S. 38-215 to
38-245, inclusive."
286. 98 Nev. at 543-44, 654 P.2d at 1026.
287. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.225 (1979).
288. Id. § 38.045(1). This section is identical to UAA § 2.
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ond, the arbitration agreement determines the parties' rights and duties in
arbitration.
VI. AWARDS
A. Grounds for Attacking an Award
The UAA recognizes five grounds for attacking an award.2 8 9 The most
common ground is that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Given the heavy
judicial caseload, courts recognize that the UAA. should be liberally inter-
preted 20 to allow parties to settle their disputes without resorting to
litigation.2
1
A reviewing court generally will not overrule an award. 29 2 The arbitra-
tor's decision is considered final on questions of law and fact in the absence of
an agreement limiting his authority. 93 Arbitrators are peculiarly competent to
adjudge the merits of an arbitration2" because they are familiar with the cus-
toms of the industry, business, or parties involved. A party aggrieved by an
award will usually have a very difficult time obtaining judicial relief.
1. Awards Inconsistent with Law
The UAA requires a court to vacate an award when the arbitrator has
exceeded his power in making the award. 2 5 Courts differ on what is sufficient
289. UAA § 12 states:
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2)
There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or cor-
ruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any
party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefore or refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the
hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue
was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party
did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection.
290. See, e.g., Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, 110 Il1. App. 3d 217, 221-
22, 441 N.E.2d 1333, 1338 (1982).
291. See, e.g., Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36,
-, 665 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1983).
292. See, e.g., Taunton Mun. Light Plant v. Paul L. Geiringer & Assocs., 560 F.
Supp. 1249, 1251-1252 (D. Mass.), affd mem., 725 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983).
293. See Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36,
665 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1983).
294. See Board of Educ. v. Daniels, 108 11. App. 3d 550, 555, 439 N.E.2d 27,
31 (1982).
295. UAA § 12(3).
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to sustain a finding that an arbitrator exceeded his authority. In recent cases,
the following events have been used to vacate awards on the ground that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority: (1) the award was based on an egregious
error of law or fact;'" (2) the award was granted in manifest disregard of the
arbitration agreement; 297 or (3) the award contravened public policy.'98
Errors of law or fact usually will not justify setting aside an arbitrator's
award. In Taunton Municipal Light Plant v. Paul L. Geiringer & Associ-
ates,' t* the court held that even if a gross error of law or fact were made, it
would be legally insufficient to set aside an award.' ° Taunton appealed an
arbitration order because it believed an error of fact affected the arbitrator's
interpretation of the contract. 1 The award was confirmed because the court
found that the error was inconsequential."'
In Cabus v. Dairyland Insurance Co.,' the court held that arbitrators
are not bound by substantive law unless the agreement provides otherwise.'"
Cabus and Kavanaugh were injured in an automobile accident with an unin-
sured motorist. Dairyland's uninsured motorist policy limits were $15,000 per
person and $30,000 per accident, and each policy contained an "anti-stacking"
provision. 0 5 The arbitrator ruled that each party was entitled to a $30,000
recovery. Dairyland argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in mak-
ing the award because he did not follow Colorado substantive law.'"0 The
court decided that even if the arbitrator failed to apply Colorado law, that
failure did not constitute grounds for setting aside the award.' The UAA
does not require an arbitrator to apply any particular substantive law.'"
A recent Michigan decision, Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Ex-
change v. Gavin,"'0 set out this standard of review for arbitration awards:
296. See, e.g., Detroit Auto Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 416 Mich. 407, 430, 331
N.W.2d 418, 428 (1982) (error of law).
297. See Board of Educ. v. Daniels, 108 Il1. App. 3d 550, 553, 439 N.E.2d 27,
29 (1982).
298. See Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, 110 Ill. App. 3d 217, 223-24, 441
N.E.2d 1333, 1338 (1982).
299. 560 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass.), affid mem., 725 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983).
300. Id. at 1251-1252.
301. Id. at 1249.
302. Id. at 1253.
303. 656 P.2d 54 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
304. Id. at 56.
305. Id. at 55.
306. Alliance Mut. Casualty Co. v. Duerson, 184 Colo. 117, 518 P.2d 1177
(1974). The Supreme Court of Colorado held that "other insurance" clauses, more
often called anti-stacking provisions, are not contrary to public policy and are
enforceable.
307. 656 P.2d at 56.
308. Id.
309. 416 Mich. 407, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982).
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whether the award rests on errors of law so material that the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their authority in making the award.810 In two consolidated cases, arbi-
trators made awards of $39,000 and $35,000 even though the insurance poli-
cies had $20,000 limits. The arbitrators had stacked policies to make the
awards, which was expressly forbidden in the insurance contract. 11 The court
established a "but for" test for determining what constitutes material error of
law. It vacated the awards because the arbitrators committed errors of law in
disregarding the anti-stacking provision, and "but for" such errors, the award
would have been substantially different. 1
In Bingham County Commission v. Interstate Electric Co., 8' the court
stated that judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is more limited than judi-
cial review of a trial court's decision. " It held that an arbitrator's findings of
law and fact are final and that the only grounds available for attacking the
decision are those established by the UAA.311 Even though a reviewing court
might find that an error of law has been committed, the arbitrator's decision is
binding on the court."" An arbitrator's misinterpretation of an arbitration
agreement is not open to judicial review. 1 7
Two recent cases illustrate the type of conduct which will establish that
an arbitrator has exceeded his authority. In In re Arbitration between Johns
Construcion Co. and Unified School District s18 the court held that in the ab-
sence of fraud or misconduct, an award will not be set aside even though based
on incorrect findings of law or fact. 1 9 The school wanted to reduce its obliga-
tion to Johns because of allegedly defective work done by him. The arbitrator
found some merit in the allegations of each party and made his award accord-
ingly. The school then moved to vacate the award. The court found no fraud
or arbitrary action on the part of the arbitrators, so it affirmed the award. 20
In Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products, Inc.,32  the court used the same reasoning
as Johns and also noted that when parties have agreed to arbitration, errors of
law or fact, or an erroneous decision of the issues do not justify vacating an
award. 32 2 The court required an arbitration award to be "completely irra-
310. Id at 434, 331 N.W.2d at 430.
311. Id. at 414-16, 331 N.W.2d at 421-422.
312. Id. at 445, 331 N.W.2d at 435.
313. 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983).
314. Id. at _, 665 P.2d at 1052.
315. Id. at __, 665 P.2d at 1051-1052.
316. Id. at __ n.7, 665 P.2d at 1052 n.7.
317. Id.
318. 233 Kan. 527, 664 P.2d 821 (1983).
319. Id. at 528, 664 P2d at 822.
320. Id. at 530, 664 P.2d at 824.
321. 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254 (1983).
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tional" before it is subject to judicial revision. 828
A party may ask that an arbitration award be vacated because the arbi-
trator exceeded his authority by disregarding the terms of the arbitration
agreement or basing the award on issues beyond his power. In In re Pacre
Corp.,2 4 a bankruptcy court determined that the relief granted was so far
beyond the scope of the issues presented for arbitration that vacation of the
award was appropriate. The court was convinced that the arbitrator did not
have a clear concept of what he was empowered to decide. 2 A real estate
contract for the purchase of a single-family house provided that in the event of
seller's default the purchaser could enforce the contract or compel the seller to
return the deposit. The arbitrator awarded the buyer $95,000 over the deposit,
gave the buyer the option to close on the home, and decided to award substan-
tial damages to buyer if no sale occurred. The court held that the arbitrator
clearly exceeded his authority because the award bore no relationship to the
relief provided for in the contract. 2
Arbitrators derive their authority from the arbitration agreement. 27 A
court will review an arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement only to deter-
mine whether the award drew its essence from the agreement. 828
In Board of Education v. Daniel,329 the question was whether it was
proper for the Board to freeze the salaries of teachers who had not completed
certain education requirements. The arbitrator determined that the Board's
actions were improper.8 0 The standard of review was whether the arbitrator
had manifestly disregarded the agreement. 31 The court held that interpreta-
tion of the agreement was part of the arbitrator's function because it was the
arbitrator's interpretation that was bargained for .88
2. Awards Contravening Public Policy
An award may be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority because the award contravened public policy. In Konicki v. Oak
Brook Racquet Club,83 the court held that an arbitrator's award in contra-
323. Id. (quoting trial court).
324. 21 Bankr. 759 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
325. Id. at 762.
326. Id. at 762-63.
327. State v. Thomas Constr. Co., 8 Kan. App. 2d 283, - , 655 P.2d 471, 474
(1982).
328. Board of Educ. v. Daniels, 108 II1. App. 3d 550, 553, 439 N.E.2d 27, 29-30
(1982).
329. 108 Ill. App. 3d 550, 439 N.E.2d 27 (1982).
330. Id at 552-53, 439 N.E.2d at 28-29.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 110 II1. App. 3d 217, 441 N.E.2d 1333 (1982).
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vention of public policy could not stand.33" The court stated that the arbitra-
tor's enforcement of a non-competition clause in a contract could violate para-
mount considerations of public policy. 35 The court reasoned that, "just as we
will not enforce a private agreement which is repugnant to established norms
of public policy, we may not ignore the same public policy concerns when they
are undermined through the process of arbitation."3 36
There appears to be some confusion among courts as to the extent that an
arbitrator should be bound by the substantive law of the jurisdiction where
arbitration occurs. Some courts find that if the arbitration agreement is silent
on the issue of applicable law, then no particular application is required and
the bargained-for interpretation of the arbitrator will be binding. 37 Other
courts take the position that arbitrators should apply the substantive law of
the jurisdiction and hold that the award will be binding so long as any error of
law is not egregious, material or substantial.33 The better approach would be
to allow courts to review arbitration awards to determine if the substantive law
was fairly followed. It is recognized that arbitrators derive their authority
from the agreement to arbitrate, and it should be implicit within the agree-
ment that the parties intended an arbitral decision to be based on a substan-
tially correct reading and interpretation of the law. It should not be presumed
by courts that the intention of the parties to submit to an arbitrator's decision
includes a coincident intention to permit the arbitrator to ignore the law in
reaching his decision.
B. Modification by Arbitrators
Section 9 of the UAA allows an arbitrator to modify or correct an award
for the reasons stated in section 13.3 9 Section 9 allows arbitrators to correct
334. Id. at 223-24, 441 N.E.2d at 1337-38.
335. Id.
336. 110 Ill. App. 3d 217, 223, 441 N.E.2d 1333, 1337 (1982) (quoting Board of
Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 74 Ill. 2d 412, 424, 386 N.E.2d 47,
52 (1979)).
337. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Daniels, 108 I11. App. 3d 550, 439 N.E.2d 27
(1982).
338. See, e.g., Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 416 Mich. 407, 331
N.W.2d 418 (1982) (arbitrators disregarded express provision of insurance policy).
339. Section 9 states:
On application of a party or, if an application to the court is pending
under Sections 11, 12 or 13, on submission to the arbitrators by the court
under such conditions as the court may order, the arbitrators may modify or
correct the award upon the grounds stated in paragraphs (1) and (3) of subdi-
vision (a) of Section 13, or for the purpose of clarifying the award. The appli-
cation shall be made within twenty days after delivery of the award to the
applicant. Written notice thereof shall be given forthwith to the opposing
party, stating he must serve his objections thereto, if any, within ten days
from the notice. The award so modified or corrected is subject to the provi-
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their own mistakes or clarify an award without one or both of the parties
having to institute judicial action. This promotes speedy dispute resolution, a
major purpose of arbitration. 34 0 Judicial review of an award which has under-
gone modification under section 9 is the same as review of an unmodified
award. The ninety-day provisions of UAA sections 12 and 13 are tolled by a
section 9 application for modification. 4
A court applied these principles in Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet
Club 3  where Oak Brook sought review of an award concerning a covenant
not to compete in Konicki's contract. Under UAA sections 12 and 13, a party
seeking review of an arbitration award must file a petition in circuit court
within ninety days after the award is made.' The issue was the effect of a
pending section 9 application upon the time period for filing a petition to va-
cate an award under section 12. The court held that an application to modify
under section 9 tolls the time for seeking review in the circuit court until the
application is finally disposed of by the arbitrator, whether the relief requested
is granted or denied.3 4" The court decided that this interpretation of section 9
is necessary so that judicial review of modified and unmodified awards be con-
ducted in the same manner's because the UAA places no time restrictions
upon an arbitrator's disposition of a petition under section 9."'
The interpretation given section 9 by the Illinois court is consistent with
the UAA's purpose of encouraging arbitration. If arbitration is to have the
desired effect of reducing clogged court calendars, arbitrators must have a
chance to correct their errors before the parties seek judicial relief. By inter-
preting section 9 to toll the ninety-day periods of sections 12 and 13, the court
allows the arbitrator to reach a final decision without risk to either party.
C. Binding Effect of an Award
One of the main reasons for the increased use of arbitration is the enor-
mous backlog in judicial dockets." 7 For arbitration to decrease the amount of
time and money expended by disputants, an arbitration award must be bind-
ing. Otherwise, parties must bear the cost of both court proceedings and essen-
sions of Sections 11, 12, and 13.
340. Red Carpet Armory Realty Co. v. Golden West Realty, 664 P.2d 93, 94
(Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Saville Int'l Inc. v. Galanti Group, 107 I11. App. 3d. 799, 802,
438 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1982).
341. UAA §§ 12(b), 13(a).
342. 110 II1. App. 3d. 217, 441 N.E.2d 1333 (1982).
343. UAA §§ 12(b), 13(a).
344. 110 111. App. 3d. at 222, 441 N.E.2d at 1337 (1982).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 221, 441 N.E.2d at 1336.
347. See Red Carpet Armory Realty Co. v. Golden Realty, 664 P.2d 93, 94
(Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Saville Int'l Inc. v. Galanti Group, 107 I11. App. 3d. 799, 802,
438 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1982).
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tially meaningless arbitration proceedings. The provisions of the UAA make
arbitration awards binding by giving courts limited authority to vacate or
modify awards84' and by allowing a court order confirming, modifying, or cor-
recting an award to be enforced just like any other judicial judgment or de-
cree.3 9 A confirmed award becomes res judicata and time limits for review of
the award will be strictly enforced. To have binding arbitration, however,
there must have been notice of a hearing and a hearing at which evidence was
actually taken.856
In Taunton Municipal Light Plant Commission v. Paul L. Geiringer &
Associates,5' the court treated an arbitration award with extreme deference
and refused to inquire into the merits of the award.8 2 An arbitration award
was issued in favor of Geiringer, and Taunton asked that the award be va-
cated. The court recognized that arbitration awards are viewed with great def-
erence 855 and that Massachusetts law requires confirmation of all awards ex-
cept those falling within certain well-defined categories. 83 An arbitrator may
not award relief that offends public policy, requires a result contrary to ex-
press statutory provisions, or transcends the limits of the contract.8 5
In Mayor of Baltimore v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.,856 the court held that
for arbitration awards to be binding, there must have been notice of arbitra-
tion and a hearing at which evidence was received.8 57 The city hired two con-
tractors to do repair work on a school building. The city did not pay the con-
tractors because their work was allegedly substandard. When the surety under
the contract filed a declaratory judgment action against the city, the city re-
sponded that binding arbitration had precluded the lawsuit. It claimed that
the assistant superintendent, whom the contract appointed to decide all dis-
putes about the construction work, had written a letter to the contractors in
which he gave them three days to resume work or be considered in default.8 "
348. An award can be vacated by a court only when it was procured by corrup-
tion or fraud, there was partiality by an arbitrator, the arbitrator exceeded his or her
powers, the arbitrator refused to postpone upon good cause shown or refused to hear
material evidence, or there was no arbitration agreement. UAA § 12. An award can be
modified or corrected by a court if there was an evident miscalculation or mistake, the
arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, or the award is imper-
fect in form. UAA § 13.
349. UAA § 14.
350. Mayor of Baltimore v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 50 Md. App. 455, 460, 438
A.2d 933, 937 (1982).
351. 560 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass.), affd mem., 725 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983).
352. Id. at 1251-52.
353. Id. at 1251.
354. Id. at 1250; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 251, § 12(A)(3) (West 1983-84).
355. 560 F.Supp. at 1251-52.
356. 50 Md. App. 455, 438 A.2d 933 (1982).
357. Id. at 461, 438 A.2d at 937.
358. Id. at 457-58, 438 A.2d at 935.
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The contract provided that his determinations were final and conclusive upon
the parties. " The court held that no binding arbitration had taken place be-
cause no evidence of arbitration was in the record. Therefore, the letter warn-
ing of default could not also serve as an arbitration award,86 and it did not
bind the contractors.361 In Red Carpet Armory Realty Co. v. Golden West
Realty,"' the court held that an arbitration agreement which contained no
restrictions on the power of the arbitrators bound the parties absolutely to the
award. 63 Red Carpet closed the sale of a business and received a commission.
Golden West claimed that it was entitled to 40% of the commission. The
Board of Realtors, acting as arbitrators, awarded 32% to Golden West. Red
Carpet claimed that the panel exceeded its powers by awarding a different
amount from that requested. Settlement of disputes by arbitration is strongly
favored, and the court decided that the parties had agreed to abide absolutely
by the decision."6 The court held that it is within the power of the arbitrator
to award an amount different from that sought.8 65
In Cabus v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 366 the court held that an expanded
agreement to arbitrate is a binding contract which provides the arbitrator with
jurisdiction to determine all matters so submitted. 6 7 An insured motorist
sought to recover from her insurance company, and the arbitrator awarded the
motorist twice the single policy uninsured motorist coverage by stacking cover-
age. The insurer had voluntarily agreed to submit the issue of "stacking" to
the arbitrator even though it was not required to do so. The company sought
359. Id. at 460-61 n.4, 438 A.2d at 936-937 n.4.
360. Id. at 463, 438 A.2d at 938.
361. Id. at 464, 438 A.2d at 939. In Saville Int'l, Inc. v. Galanti Group, 107 Ill.
App. 3d. 799, 438 N.E.2d 509 (1982), Galanti appealed from the trial court's confir-
mation of part of an award in favor of Saville. The appellate court upheld the award. It
reasoned that because of the increased burden on court systems, the status of an arbi-
trator is virtually equal to that of a judge. Awards made by an arbitrator will be up-
held unless an applicant can show that the award should be vacated for one of the
grounds in UAA §§ 12 or 13. Id. at 802, 438 N.E.2d at 512. In Board of Educ. v.
Daniels, 108 I11. App. 3d. 550, 439 N.E.2d 27 (1982), the court held that because the
parties have bargained for an arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement, a court will
not overturn an award just because its interpretation of the agreement is different from
that of the arbitrator. Id. at 553, 439 N.E.2d at 29. The court upheld the award be-
cause of the overriding interest in finality inherent in arbitration. Because it is the
arbitrator's interpretation of the contract for which the parties bargained, his interpre-
tation of the contract will be binding on them. A court will only review an arbitrator's
interpretation to determine whether the award drew its "essence" from the agreement
so as to prevent manifest disregard of the agreement. Id.
362. 644 P.2d 93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
363. Id. at 94.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. 656 P.2d 54 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
367. Id. at 55.
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to withdraw the issue prior to the award, but the arbitrator ruled on it any-
way. Dairyland claimed on appeal that it had the power to unilaterally with-
draw the stacking issue.8" The court decided that if parties agree to expand
an original contract by mutual consent, the parties thereby also agree to ex-
pand the arbitrator's jurisdiction to decide all matters so submitted. Once an
issue is submitted, it can only be withdrawn if the parties mutually agree to do
SO.3
6 9
In Bingham County Commission v. Interstate Electric Co.,7 0 the court
held that a court may not overrule an award on the ground that it would have
reached a different decision because arbitration inherently involves a decision
by the parties to submit their disputes to the final and binding judgment of an
arbitrator.8 7 1 Interstate Electric Co. (IEC) sought to arbitrate its dispute with
the county, and the arbitrator made an award to IEC. The county filed a
motion to vacate the award. The court refused to vacate because an essential
element of arbitration is the parties' decision to accept final and binding arbi-
tration. Where parties so agree, they necessarily have accepted the fact that
the arbitrator's interpretation of the law and facts might be different from that
of a court or themselves. The court held that the arbitrator's award will be
binding on them except in the limited circumstances set out in UAA sections
12 or 1 3.712 A court cannot even review a question of law on which the arbi-
trator's decision is wrong. 87 8
In State v. Thomas Construction Co., 81 7 the court held that an award
confirmed by a court has the same res judicata effect as any judgment. 78 The
State of Kansas asked for a dismissal without prejudice of what it character-
ized as a permissive counterclaim filed in an arbitration proceeding. The arbi-
trators granted the dismissal without prejudice and then made an award which
stated that it was in full settlement of all claims submitted to arbitation. The
award was confirmed. 8 6 Later, the State filed a state court action to recover
on the claims that were withdrawn. The trial court dismissed the State's claim
on the ground that it was tantamount to a compulsory counterclaim and was
precluded by the prior award.87 7 The appellate court reversed because the
rules of civil procedure are not applicable to an arbitration proceeding in the
absence of a mutual agreement to the contrary. Counterclaims are not com-
pulsory in arbitration, and it was error for the trial court to dismiss the State's
368. Id.
369. Id. at 55-56.
370. 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983).
371. Id. at - n.6, 665 P.2d at 1051 n.6.
372. Id.
373. Id. at -, 665 P.2d at 1052 n.7.
374. 8 Kan. App. 2d 283, 655 P.2d 471 (1982).
375. Id. at - 655 P.2d at 471.
376. Id. at __, 655 P.2d at 473.
377. Id. at -' 655 P.2d at 473-474.
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claim on that ground. 7 8 The court decided that an award confirmed by a
court is res judicata as to all matters actually submitted 879 but the parties are
only precluded as to matters that were actually heard and covered by an
award.
In Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products,"° the court decided that a court can-
not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator on the merits of the dis-
pute."' It held that a court cannot review an arbitration award de novo be-
cause to permit such a review would make arbitration a "dress rehearsal" for
litigation rather than a less expensive and more efficient alternative to
litigation. 81
In Goldberger v. Hofco, Inc.,"3 the court held that a party who relys on a
confirmed award is bound by the terms of that award." 4 Hofco filed a motion
for summary judgment in a pending mechanic's lien action relying on a con-
firmed arbitration award. The trial court granted the motion and entered judg-
ment for the amount of the award plus interest. The award expressly denied
Hofco's right to interest and therefore conflicted with the trial court's deci-
sion." 5 The appellate court held that the trial court was bound by the terms of
the arbitration award and could not award Hofco interest when the arbitrators
expressly denied it.$"
In Haskell v. Forest Land & Timber Co.," 7 Forest Land, on a judgment
confirming an arbitration award, asked for interest from the date the original
judgment was entered. The appellate court found that Forest Land was enti-
tled to the statutory rate of interest, but that the interest should run only from
the date that the award was confirmed by the highest court to which it was
appealed. This result is necessary to avoid unfairness in forcing an appellant to
assume the burden and expense of appealing an improper award, but at the
same time also holding him liable for interest from the date of the original
award.8"
The decisions addressing the binding effect of awards have been uniform.
In virtually all of the cases, an award was held binding on parties in the same
way that the judgment of a court is binding. Courts usually reason that the
strong public policy favoring arbitration requires such a result. A binding
award is necessary to secure the benefits of arbitration because no one will
378. Id. at -, 655 P.2d at 474.
379. Id. at , 655 P.2d at 475.
380. 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254 (1983).
381. Id. at 348-49, 662 P.2d at 1262.
382. Id.
383. 422 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
384. Id. at 899.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 899-900.
387. 426 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
388. Id. at 1253-54.
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arbitrate unless courts accord proper respect to arbitrators' decisions.
D. Reasons for Awards
The UAA does not require arbitrators to give reasons for their awards.",
Courts likewise generally do not require arbitrators to justify their decisions.3 90
In no case has an arbitrator's award been vacated for failure to specify or give
reasons for the award.
In Hilltop Construction Inc. v. Lou Park Apartments,3  the court recog-
nized that arbitrators do not need to present reasons for their decision. 392 Lou
Park appealed from an award that was not itemized with respect to the vari-
ous claims. 93 The court refused to vacate the award because "'[an arbitration
award which awards a sum of money in satisfaction of various claims of the
parties need not separately treat each claim or explain the arbitrators reason-
ing process." 3" Although a trial court has the authority to order an arbitrator
to clarify or explain his reasoning process, the exercise of that power is purely
discretionary. 95
VII. FEES AND EXPENSES
Under the UAA, the arbitrators' fees and expenses, along with other ex-
penses incurred in the conduct of the litigation, shall be paid as provided in
the award unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides. 3" Attorney's
fees are specifically excluded from the list of expenses which may be
awarded.3 9 7 The arbitrator is vested with considerable discretion to determine
the assessment of costs where the arbitration agreement is silent on the
matter.
Courts generally will confirm an award of costs when taxed pursuant to
the arbitration agreement or when particularly described in the award .3 9 Al-
though attorneys' fees incurred prior to and during arbitration are not recover-
able 3 99 such expenses incurred in proceedings to confirm, modify, or correct
an award have been held to be recoverable by some courts under UAA section
389. UAA § 12.
390. Hilltop Constr. Inc. v. Lou Park Apartments, 324 N.W.2d 236 (Minn.
1982).
391. Id.
392. Id. at 240.
393. Id. at 237.
394. Id. at 240.
395. Id.
396. UAA § 10.
397. Id.
398. See Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665
P.2d 1046 (1983); Mirabella v. Safeway Ins. Co., 114 11. App. 3d 680, 449 N.E.2d
258 (1983).
399. Bingham County, 105 Idaho at -, 665 P.2d at 1052.
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14."o One court, however, has limited recoverable expenses to the court costs
of such an action.4
0 1
Special problems arise where the provision governing fees and expenses in
the arbitration agreement is held invalid because it conflicts with particular
statutes, especially those relating to uninsured motorist coverage in automobile
insurance policies. At least one court has denied the claims of arbitrators to
recover their fees from an insurer under those circumstances. 0 2 Another court
has allowed an insured to recover costs from his insurer under nearly identical
circumstances 03 by classifying the insured's request as a motion to modify the
award even though the award made no mention of costs and the grounds for
modification fell outside those permitted by UAA section 13.404 The fact that
an award of fees or expenses may be erroneous in a particular case will not
necessarily cause the entire award to be invalid.40 5
In Bingham County Commission v. Interstate Electric Co.,4' the court
looked to the plain meaning of UAA section 10407 in deciding that attorneys'
fees could not be assessed in an arbitration award without the parties' con-
sent.40 8 The arbitrator had awarded attorney's fees to IEC in addition to dam-
ages sustained because of a dispute with the county over a construction con-
tract.'09 The trial court vacated the attorneys' fee award,' 10 and the appellate
court affirmed because section 10 "militates against the power of an arbitrator
to award attorney fees to one of the parties absent a contractual agreement to
do so."4"1
Attorney's fees incurred while seeking confirmation, modification, or cor-
rection of an award may be recovered. UAA section 14 gives the trial court
discretion to award the costs of an application to confirm, modify, or correct
an award and of the proceedings which follow such an application. In County
of Clark v. Blanchard Construction Co.,' the court held attorneys' fees to be
part of the costs recoverable on such an application, taxable in the discretion
400. County of Clark v. Blanchard Constr. Co., 98 Nev. 488, 653 P.2d 1217
(Nev. 1983).
401. Heyman v. Vonelli, 413 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
402. Mirabella v. Safeway Ins. Co., 114 II1. App. 3d 680, 449 N.E.2d 258
(1983).
403. American Indem. Co. v. Comeau, 419 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
404. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.11 (West Supp. 1983).
405. Saville Int'l, Inc. v. Galanti Group, Inc., 107 I11. App. 3d 799, 438 N.E.2d
509 (1982).
406. 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983).
407. IDAHO CODE § 7-910 (1979).
408. 105 Idaho at - 665 P.2d at 1052-53.
409. Id. at -, 665 P.2d at 1048.
410. Id.
411. Id. at .. , 665 P.2d at 1052.
412. 98 Nev. 488, 653 P.2d 1217 (1982).
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of the trial court. Blanchard and a subcontractor had sought an order confirm-
ing an arbitration award. They also sought attorney's fees even though the
agreement to arbitrate and the award were silent on the subject. The trial
court confirmed the award and ordered payment of attorney's fees. The appel-
late court held that UAA section 14"18 permits an award of attorney's fees
incurred to have the basic award confirmed because those costs are distin-
guishable from an award of attorney's fees incurred to obtain the award."'
A court combined the principles set out in the foregoing cases with some
variations in deciding Heyman v. Vonelli.1 6 Heyman sought to arbitrate a
dispute involving the breach of a construction contract by Vonelli. Vonelli filed
suit in circuit court to foreclose on a mechanic's lien involved in the same
dispute. Heyman had the suit dismissed, and Vonelli then asserted the lien as
a counterclaim to Heyman's demand for arbitration. Vonelli was successful on
his counterclaim and was awarded costs by the arbitrator. The trial court con-
firmed this award and awarded Vonelli attorney's fees and costs incurred in
the lien litigation.4 16 The appellate court reversed the order granting addi-
tional fees and expenses because the only additional expenses that could be
assessed by the trial court were the court costs incurred pursuant to confirm-
ing the award."1 7 The court pointed out that recovery of attorney's fees was
specifically excluded under the UAA. " s
An arbitration clause in an uninsured motorist provision which requires
the insured to pay a portion of the arbitrators' fees and expenses is invalid' 1
because it dilutes the mandatory uninsured motorist coverage required by state
insurance laws.41 0 A court applying UAA section 10 may have a difficult time
reaching an equitable result when arbitrators of uninsured motorist disputes
fail to make an award of costs and the parties rely on such an invalid provi-
sion.4 2 1 In Mirabella v. Safeway Insurance Co.,'22 two arbitrators sued an in-
surance company to recover their fees for settling an uninsured motorist cover-
age dispute between the company and its insured. The policy required the
insured to pay part of the arbitrators' fees and expenses, and the arbitration
award was silent as to costs. The trial court awarded $400 to each plaintiff.
The appellate court held that the arbitrators could not recover under the
413. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.165 (1979).
414. Blanchard, 98 Nev. at 492, 653 P.2d at 1220.
415. 413 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
416. Id. at 1255.
417. Id. at 1256.
418. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.11 (West Supp. 1983).
419. See American Indem. Co. V. Comeau, 419 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Nickla v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 38 I11. App. 3d 931, 349 N.E.2d
644 (1976).
420. See, e.g., Nickla, 38 I11. App. 3d at 931, 349 N.E.2d at 647.
421. These provisions usually require each party to pay the costs of his chosen
arbitrator and split the costs of the neutral arbitrator. Id.
422. 114 Iil. App. 3d 680, 449 N.E.2d 258 (1983).
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UAA"' because the policy provision was invalid and the award made no men-
tion of arbitrator's fees.4 23
In American Indemnity Co. v. Comeau, the court faced a similar issue. 25
The insured rather than the arbitrators sought arbitration expenses. His arbi-
tration award did not award him costs, and the insurance policy expense
clause was invalid. The trial court assessed costs against the insurance com-
pany, and the appellate court affirmed. Although the insured sought an award
of fees by a motion to tax costs,"26 the appellate court treated the insured's
request for costs as an application to modify the arbitrator's award. 27 The
court relied on UAA section 14428 to support its decision to award costs to the
insured and indicated that costs may always be assessed against an insurance
company in arbitration concerning uninsured motorist coverage.' 2'9
When fees are erroneously assessed, the rest of the award is still valid. In
Saville International, Inc. v. Galanti Group,'80 the arbitrators ordered the par-
ties to share arbitration fees and expenses. The trial court vacated the assess-
ment of arbitrator's costs. The appellate court affirmed because the arbitrators
exceeded their authority in allowing themselves compensation, but it rejected
the argument that the entire award must be vacated under such
circumstances.' 3 '
Courts which apply the plain meaning rule to UAA section 10 generally
produce satisfactory results. That section is explicit in excluding attorney's
fees from recoverable costs and in describing the circumstances under which
other costs may be assessed. The uninsured motorist cases present a unique
situation because the arbitrators in those cases omitted any reference to costs
in their awards in reliance upon the express provisions of the policy. Arbitra-
tors have failed to recover their costs because courts charge them with notice
that the policy's payment provision is void.' 3 ' Cases in which the insured seeks
to have such costs assessed against the insurer are much more difficult. If the
court leaves the parties as it finds them, its action can be justified as an appli-
cation of the plain meaning of UAA section 10. Some courts have refused to
so apply section 10 because that would effectively revive the invalid provision
423. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 110 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
424. Mirabella, 114 Il1. App. 3d at 683, 449 N.E.2d at 260.
425. 419 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
426. Id.
427. Id. at 672.
428. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.15 (West Supp. 1983).
429. Id. at 671.
430. 107 I1. App. 3d 799, 438 N.E.2d 509 (1982).
431. "[W]here arbitrators have exceeded their authority in one respect such as
allowance of fees, their decision is unenforceable only to the extent that such authority
was exceeded." Id. at 801, 438 N.E.2d at 511 (citing Board of Educ. v. Champaign
Educ. Ass'n, 15 I11. App. 3d 335, 340, 304 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1973)).
432. Such clauses have been void in Illinois since 1976. See Nickla v. Industrial
Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 38 I11. App. 3d 927, 349 N.E.2d 644 (1976).
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in the insurance policy and diminish the uninsured motorist protection re-
quired by law. Such courts should rest their decisions on the ground that the
insurer should be held responsible for placing invalid provisions in its policies
instead of inserting language into UAA section 10 which substantially alters
its intent and effect. This achieves the same result and is more defensible.
Unlike section 10, section 14 is ambiguous about whether attorney's fees
are recoverable when incurred in proceedings to confirm, modify, or correct an
award. There is a good argument that attorney's fees were intended to be tax-
able in proceedings under section 14 because section 10 specifically excludes
attorney's fees from recoverable costs and section 14 does not.
VIII. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF AWARDS
A. Confirmation
The UAA permits confirmation 488 or vacation'8 of arbitration awards. A
motion to vacate must be made within ninety days of the award unless based
on fraud, corruption, or other undue means.' 8 5 Some courts impose the ninety-
day limit on defenses to a confirmation proceeding;'4 others do not.48 7 There
is no time limit on raising nonstatutory defenses.4' The ninety-day period does
not begin to run until the party opposing the award receives constructive no-
tice of the grounds for vacation."3'
Substantively, courts narrowly construe both grounds to vacate and de-
fenses to confirmation. Arbitrators can exceed their powers when ruling on
subjects not presented for arbitration, but the party opposing the award must
clearly prove the abuse. This can be difficult because parties have no right to
demand clarification of arbitration awards. 40 Partiality is also difficult to
prove because minor prior contact with a party4"' or a party's clients"4 ' are
insufficient grounds for vacation. A more effective way of challenging an arbi-
tration award is to challenge the arbitrability of the dispute. An arbitrability
433. UAA § 11.
434. UAA § 12.
435. UAA § 12(b).
436. E.g., T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects & Planners, 661 P.2d 1040,
1042 (Wyo. 1983).
437. E.g., Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enters., 414 Mich. 95, 101, 323
N.W.2d 1, 3 (1982).
438. McDonald v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
439. T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects & Planners, 661 P.2d 1040, 1042
(Wyo. 1983).
440. Hilltop Constr., Inc. v. Lou Park Apartments, 324 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn.
1982).
441. Foley Co. v. Grinsted Prods., Inc., 233 Kan. 339, 343-44, 662 P.2d 1254,
1258 (1983).
442. Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 838 (1982).
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argument is more favored because it directly affects the jurisdiction of both
courts and arbitrators. 448 Nonstatutory grounds for vacation are also al-
lowed. 44 Errors of law or fact committed by an arbitrator in good faith are
insufficient grounds for vacating an award unless they demonstrate a com-
pletely irrational reading of the contract.'" 5
In Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enterprises,'4 6 the trial court
refused to let defendant deny the validity of the arbitration agreement when
the defense was raised for the first time more than ninety days after the award
was delivered to him. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed because it de-
cided that the ninety-day rule does not apply to defenses to a confirmation
proceeding. 47 Defendant's arbitrability defense was a direct attack on the ju-
risdiction of both the court and the arbitrators, so the court reasoned that an
award cannot be enforced unless the court first determines that it has jurisdic-
tion to act. 448 Therefore, the trial court itself should have decided the arbi-
trability issue, regardless of the statutory time limits."49
A different decision on a similar issue was reached in T & M Properties
v. ZVFK Architects & Planners.'" A party raised the defense that the arbi-
trators had exceeded their powers by deciding an issue not submitted to arbi-
tration. This defense was raised after more than ninety days had elapsed. The
appellate court decided that a motion to vacate and a motion raising defenses
to confirmation should have identical time limits because they both essentially
raise the same claims and because dilatory tactics are inappropriate for arbi-
tration.451 The court noted that the ninety-day requirement might be extended
if a party did not have constructive knowledge of the grounds for a valid de-
fense at the time of delivery of the award to him. 452
In McDonald v. Allstate Ins. Co.,45 the defendant argued that the claim
had been satisfied before arbitration. This defense was raised after the ninety
day limit. The appellate court held that an arbitration award cannot be sum-
marily confirmed after the ninety-day period expires because nonstatutory de-
fenses remain valid. 4" The defense of satisfaction and accord remains valid
443. Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enters., 414 Mich. 95, 98, 323
N.W.2d 1, 2 (1982).444. McDonald v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
445. Foley Co. v. Grinsted Prods., Inc., 233 Kan. 339, 347, 662 P.2d 1254, 1262
(1983) (quoting unreported trial court opinion with approval).
446. 414 Mich. 95, 323 N.W.2d 1 (1982).
447. Id. at 101, 323 N.W.2d at 3.
448. Id. at 98, 323 N.W.2d at 2.
449. Id.
450. 661 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1983).
451. Id. at 1042.
452. Id. at 1044.
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beyond the time limit because it is extrinsic to the arbitration process.'" This
was true in McDonald even though the defense obliquely implicated the statu-
tory ground that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers by deciding an
issue not submitted to arbitration."
In Bernard v. Hemisphere Hotel Management, Inc.,457 possible grounds
for disqualification of the arbitration chairman became apparent during the
hearing. Before the American Arbitration Association could interpret its rules
on the subject, the trial court disqualified the arbitrator and ordered that the
hearing proceed with the remaining arbitrators. The appellate court reversed
because the trial judge improperly interpreted arbitration rules during the ar-
bitration hearing. 4" The court held that a trial court must accept the associa-
tion's interpretation of its rules while arbitration is proceeding. The trial court
is not bound by the association's decision as to bias, but it only has the power
to grant post-award relief.45
In Hilltop Construction Inc. v. Lou Park Apartments,460 the arbitrators
awarded damages which were not itemized. An ambiguity in the award per-
mitted the inference that the panel had ruled on a contract that was not in-
volved in the dispute. The party opposing the award asked the trial court to
compel the arbitrators to clarify the award, but the motion was denied.""1 The
appellate court affirmed because parties are not entitled to clarification or
itemization of an award as a matter of right.4 6 The trial judge has the discre-
tionary authority to require arbitrators to clarify awards, 46 3 and the ambiguity
in the award was insufficient to sustain the burden of clearly showing an abuse
of discretion by the trial judge.'"
In Foley Co. v. Grinsted Products, Inc.,4' 5 an arbitrator had engaged in
minor business dealings with a party five years before the hearing. Another
arbitrator assumed the duties as chairman of the panel when the possible bias
was discovered. The appellate court confirmed the award because minimum
prior contact between an arbitrator and a party does not amount to evident
partiality. 466 In the court's view, even errors of law and fact committed by the
455. Id. at 582.
456. Id.
457. 16 Mass. App. 261, 450 N.E.2d 1084, appeal denied, 390 Mass. 1102, 454
N.E.2d 1276 (1983).
458. Id. at - , 450 N.E.2d at 1086.
459. Id.
460. 324 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1982).
461. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed this part of the decision on the
ground that the judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied the request to seek
clarification from the arbitrators. Id. at 240.
462. Id. at 240.
463. Id. at 236.
464. Id. at 239.
465. 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254 (1983).
466. Id. at 345-46, 662 P.2d at 1258.
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arbitrators in good faith are insufficient grounds for vacation unless they
demonstrate a completely irrational reading of the contract."
7
In Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy,"68 Cudahy challenged the arbitrability of the
dispute for the first time after the award had been confirmed. She argued that
the arbitration proceeding was invalid because the dispute, with one exception,
involved a complex series of contracts and parties not subject to the arbitration
agreement and that her rights were impaired by arbitration of only one such
contract. The court confirmed the award. It held that her defense could not be
timely raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider confirmation. 4 ' The
court decided that lack of arbitrability is a defense to confirmation only if the
contract is void, and the court will not review the merits of the controversy to
determine this threshold question.'
0
Courts are extremely reluctant to overturn arbitrators' awards in a confir-
mation proceeding. Courts do not want arbitration to be a mere rehearsal for
litigation.' 7 1 To avoid this result, courts should determine the timeliness of
motions raising defenses to confirmation by the same time limits as motions to




After an arbitrator has issued an award, a dissatisfied party may move to
set it aside. Five specific grounds in the UAA warrant vacation of an award.'
7
'
467. Id. at 347, 662 P.2d at 1261 (quoting unreported trial court opinion with
approval).
468. 104 Idaho 106, 656 P.2d 1359 (1982).
469. Id. at , 656 P.2d at 1360.
470. Id. at __, 656 P.2d at 1362. Cudahy originally raised the defense of lack
of arbitrability with the trial judge. The trial court briefly examined the issue because
neither party had access to the recently-enacted arbitration rules, and it declared the
dispute arbitrable. The dissent argued that a full opportunity to litigate the question
whether the contract is void is necessary to the determination of arbitrability because a
close scrutiny of the merits is required to resolve the issue. Id. at -, 656 P.2d at
1367. It also agreed with Cudahy that arbitration of only one of a series of related
contracts deprived her of her rights. Id. at -, 656 P.2d at 1365.
471. Ormsbee Dev. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1153 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 838 (1982).
472. T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects & Planners, 661 P.2d 1040, 1042
(Wyo. 1983).
473. Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106, -, 656 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1983).
474. UAA § 12(a) states:
Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (1)
The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2)
There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or cor-
ruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any
party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused
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Unless a motion to vacate is based upon specified statutory grounds, courts
will not consider it. For example, fraud is a recognized ground for vacation,47 5
but failure of an arbitrator to take an oath is not. 47 ' The UAA mandates judi-
cial confirmation of the award unless specified statutory grounds for vacation
or modification are found.'77
1. Exceeding the Arbitrator's Authority
Under the UAA, a court may vacate an arbitration award on the ground
that the arbitrator exceeded his powers. 47 8 Courts follow several principles in
determining whether an arbitrator has exceeded his powers. The agreement
determines the scope of an arbitrator's authority if the agreement does not
restrict the power of the arbitrator and the parties agree to abide absolutely
his decision. A court may not override the agreement in those circumstances.
An arbitrator can exceed his powers by considering issues not submitted to
him by the parties or issues beyond the scope of the agreement. Partial vaca-
tion is sometimes required because an arbitrator's decision can only be vacated
to the extent that his authority was exceeded. A court must accept an arbitra-
tor's substantive interpretation of an agreement or contract even though the
court's interpretation differs from that of the arbitrator unless the award indi-
cates that it is tainted by dishonesty or based on a completely irrational inter-
pretation of the agreement. An award must not offend public policy or require
a result that contravenes an express statutory provision, but it is valid if there
is any rational basis for concluding that the award is lawful. An award may be
vacated where the arbitrator commits an egregious mistake of law.
In Red Carpet Armory Realty v. Golden West Realty,'7 the court held
that it may not override an arbitration agreement which does not restrict the
power of the arbitrator if the parties agree to abide absolutely by his deci-
sion. 480 The arbitration panel awarded Golden West a percentage of a sales
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the
hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue
was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party
did not participate in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection;
but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted
by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm
the award.
475. UAA § 12(a)(1) allows a court to vacate an award "procured by corrup-
tion, fraud or other undue means."
476. See, e.g., Salter v. Farner, 653 P.2d 413 (Colo. 1982).
477. Id. at 414.
478. UAA § 12(a)(3).
479. 644 P.2d 93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
480. Id. at 93-94.
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commission received by Red Carpet, but the award was less than the amount
claimed. Red Carpet argued that the panel exceeded its powers because it
should have awarded either the entire commission or nothing at all.'"8 The
court held that Red Carpet was bound by the panel's decision 82 because the
parties had agreed to give the arbitrators blanket authority to decide the
dispute. 488
In Watson v. Duval County School Board,4" the court held that an arbi-
trator cannot award relief that the parties have not requested. 88 Watson de-
manded arbitration of a dispute concerning the school's refusal to remove two
memorandums in her personnel file and reinstate her as a teacher's aid. The
arbitrator ordered Watson's reinstatement and the removal of four other docu-
ments in addition to the two challenged memos.'" The appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's vacation of the award because the arbitrator exceeded
his powers in removing the unchallenged documents. The court reasoned that
the board was not on notice that the disputed material included the four docu-
ments and therefore did not have an opportunity to object to their removal.
Vacation of the reinstatement portion of the award also was proper because
reinstatement was based on the arbitrator's conclusion that all six letters con-
tributed to the board's refusal to renew her contract. 487
In Bingham County Commission v. Interstate Electric Co. (IEC),' " the
court affirmed the principle that an arbitrator exceeds his power only when he
considers issues not submitted to him by the parties or beyond the scope of the
parties contract. 89 IEC subcontracted with the county to provide electrical
work on a construction project. Arbitration resulted when the county denied
IEC's claim for additional compensation to cover cost overruns due to delay.
The arbitrator awarded damages, fees, and expenses to IEC.'" The court af-
firmed and vacated parts of the award. It found that the arbitrator did not
exceed his powers in awarding damages and expenses because the contract
between the parties contemplated a damage award against the county if it was
responsible for the delay. The court ruled that the arbitrator did exceed his
powers in awarding attorney's fees because there was no agreement between
the parties to award fees. ' 1
481. Id. at 93.
482. Id. at 94.
483. The arbitration agreement stated that both parties would "abide absolutely
by the award and findings of the arbitrators." Id. at 94.
484. 408 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
485. Id. at 1056.
486. Id. at 1053-54.
487. Id. at 1055-56.
488. 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983).
489. Id. at , 665 P.2d at 1052.
490. Id. at , 665 P.2d at 1047-48.
491. Id. at 665 P.2d at 1052.
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In T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects and Planners,4 ' the court held
that a motion to vacate an award because the arbitrator exceeded his author-
ity must be timely filed. 493 The award was based on three contracts, two of
which involved ZVFK and Miracle Enterprises. T & M elected not to attend
the arbitration hearing, but it later claimed that the demand for arbitration
failed to put it on notice that Miracle would be involved in the dispute. It
argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in granting an award based
on the Miracle contract. The court decided that T & M's failure to move to
vacate the award within ninety days precluded vacation of the award because
the award was sufficient to put T & M on notice that the arbitrator had ruled
on the Miracle contract."
In Saville International, Inc. v. Galanti Group, Inc.,4"5 the court affirmed
a partial vacation of an award on the ground that an arbitrator's award can be
vacated only to the extent that it exceeds the arbitrator's authority."" The
award directed payment of damages, as permitted by the agreement, and or-
dered that fees and expenses of the AAA be paid equally by each party. Be-
cause the agreement did not authorize the arbitrator to award fees, the court
vacated only that portion of the award addressing payment of fees.''
Two related principles governed the decision of the court not to vacate an
award in Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products, Inc.4" First, a court must accept
an arbitrator's substantive interpretation of an agreement or contract even
though the court's interpretation differs from that of the arbitrator. Second, a
court may not vacate an arbitrator's award unless it is tainted by dishonesty or
based on a completely irrational interpretation of the contract.'" The contro-
versy involved amounts allegedly owed to a subcontractor resulting from
change orders and interference by the general contractor. The arbitrators
awarded the subcontractor $247,980. The general contractor argued that the
arbitrators exceeded their powers by entering an excessive award, by entering
an award not supported by the evidence, and by granting pre-decision and
post-decision interest.5" The court refused to vacate the award because the
general contractor offered no credible reason to vacate the award and was
simply asking the court to substitute its interpretation of the contract for that
of the arbitrator. 01
492. 661 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1983).
493. Id. at 1044-45.
494. Id. at 1044.
495. 107 Il1. App. 3d 799, 438 N.E.2d 509 (1982).
496. Id. at 801, 438 N.E.2d at 511.
497. Id.
498. 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254 (1983).
499. Id. at 347, 662 P.2d at 1261-62.
500. Id. at 347, 662 P.2d at 1261.
501. Id. at 348, 662 P.2d at 1262.
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In Starr v. Abrams Construction Co., 0' the court's decision was based on
the principle that an award is valid if there is a rational basis for enforcing it
and it does not violate statutory provisions or public policy.5 03 Abrams con-
tracted with Starr to construct a nursing home, and the parties orally agreed
that Starr would pay Abrams the costs of completing construction in excess of
the contract price. The trial court held that the arbitrators did not exceed their
authority in awarding Abrams $66,856 on the oral agreement. Starr moved to
vacate the award on the theory that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers
by enforcing the oral agreement, thereby condoning illegal conduct and violat-
ing public policy on the issue of non-disclosure.5°4 The court disagreed and
presented four reasons why a rational basis existed for enforcing the award.
First, neither the oral agreement nor its performance were per se illegal. Sec-
ond, Starr was also a party to the allegedly fraudulent statement. Third, the
claim appeared to represent only actual extra costs of construction. Fourth,
the agreement in substance did not significantly undermine FHA mortgage
insurance policies and practices. 05
In Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Gavin,' the court
announced the principle that an arbitrator exceeds his authority by acting in
manifest disregard of the law.5 07 Two cases were consolidated in the opinion.
In both cases, the defendants were injured in automobile accidents involving
uninsured motorists. Each defendant carried several insurance policies on his
vehicles issued by the plaintiff, and each policy contained a standard $20,000
limit of liability. The defendants asked the arbitrators to stack the policies to
increase the amount recoverable even though the policies contained a clear
anti-stacking clause.50 8 The arbitrators granted awards in excess of $20,000 to
each defendant based on the stacking theory.50 9 The court held that by disre-
garding the "anti-stacking" provision of the contracts, the arbitrators commit-
ted errors of law so substantial that, but for such errors, the awards would
have been substantially different. 10
Ragin v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.51 ' similarly held that an award may
be vacated where relief has been granted under an egregious mistake of law.5"'
The arbitration panel allowed an award under an uninsured motorist provision
of Ragin's policy even though the driver of the other vehicle was insured and
502. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 74, 448 N.E.2d 1311 (1983).
503. Id. at -, 448 N.E.2d at 1314.
504. Id. at -, 448 N.E.2d at 1312-14.
505. Id. at -, 448 N.E.2d at 1314-15.
506. 416 Mich. 407, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982).
507. Id. at 445, 331 N.W.2d 430.
508. Id. at 412-15, 331 N.W.2d at 421-22.
509. Id. at 411, 331 N.W.2d at 422.
510. Id. at 451, 331 N.W.2d at 435.
511. 461 A.2d 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
512. Id. at 858.
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Ragin recovered under that policy. 18 The court held that the arbitrators' con-
clusion that an underinsured driver was equivalent to an uninsured driver con-
stituted an egregious mistake of law.51 4
2. Bias or Misconduct
An award may be vacated when there is evidence of arbitrator bias or
partiality to a party or arbitrator misconduct that prejudiced the rights of a
party.5 15 It is difficult to get an award set aside on the ground of bias because
most courts strictly interpret this provision. Several principles guide the courts
in this area. First, a party to an arbitration hearing is entitled to a fair and
impartial hearing. Second, courts favor the finality of the arbitration process
and require a very strong evidentiary showing of arbitrator bias or prejudice
before an award will be vacated. Third, courts view an arbitrator's status in
the arbitration proceeding as practically equivalent to a judge's status in a
trial. Fourth, courts rely on the principle that minimal contacts between an
arbitrator and a party are not sufficient to establish partiality or prejudice.
In Ronwin v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc.5'1 the court refused to va-
cate an award because the party failed to present clear and convincing evi-
dence that the arbitrators were biased.' Ronwin, an investor, attributed his
substantial losses in the commodities market to Piper, a commodities broker.
The arbitrators denied Ronwin's claim, so he moved to vacate the award.
Ronwin argued that the arbitrators showed their partiality to the other party
by "leaping" to the party's aid during questioning and by interfering with
Ronwin's cross-examination of a witness.518 The court held that these events
were merely demonstrations of consideration and attentiveness to both
parties."1
In Saville International, Inc. v. Galanti Group, Inc.,'20 the court refused
to vacate an award because no arbitrator was shown to have a direct interest
in the outcome of the proceedings. 21 The arbitration panel entered an award
for the plaintiff, and the trial court confirmed the award.52  Defendant asked
that the award be vacated because the arbitrators were not impartial.' 3 His
evidence of partiality consisted of an allegedly leading question asked by an
513. Id. at 857.
514. Id. at 858.
515. UAA § 12(a)(2).
516. 113 Ill. App. 3d 687, 447 N.E.2d 954 (1983).
517. Id. at 692-93, 447 N.E.2d at 958.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. 107 Ill. App. 3d 799, 438 N.E.2d 509 (1982).
521. Id. at 800, 438 N.E.2d at 511.
522. Id. at 799-803, 438 N.E.2d at 510-13.
523. The motion was brought under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 12 (1981), which
is identical to UAA § 12(a).
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arbitrator, a comment by the arbitrator about payment of arbitration fees, and
an allegedly improper discussion between the arbitrator and the plaintiff."
The appellate court refused to vacate the award because it decided that an
arbitrator, like a trial judge, should have the right to ask leading questions if
they are necessary to obtain the truth or clarify the issues. Defendant's exam-
ples of partiality were not strong and convincing evidence of prejudice or
bias,525 so the court concluded that the defendant had received a fair and im-
partial arbitration hearing.5
The court held in Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products, Inc.127 that minimal
prior contact between a neutral arbitrator and a party was not sufficient evi-
dence of partiality to support vacation.52 8 The arbitration panel entered an
award in Foley's favor, and the court refused to vacate it for two reasons.
First, it would be unreasonable to infer bias on the arbitrator's part from the
minor previous business relationship that the defendant proved.5 9 Second, the
contract required each arbitrator to have expertise in mechanical contracting,
the field of the dispute. Because this requirement limited the number of indi-
viduals in the community who could serve as arbitrators, the court held that
minimal contacts between the arbitrator and the parties were to be
anticipated.530
In Commonwealth v. Holt Hauling & Warehousing Systems, Inc.,531 the
court held that an award was properly vacated because the arbitrator was pre-
viously involved with one of the parties.552 The Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board and Holt had executed a contract that obligated Holt to perform cer-
tain services for the Board. A dispute was submitted to an arbitrator, the dep-
uty attorney general, who found in the Board's favor. Holt sought to have the
award vacated on partiality grounds because the arbitrator, as deputy attorney
general, had approved the contract in his capacity as counsel for the Board.53
The court decided that the award was properly vacated because a party is
entitled to a full and fair hearing conducted by an arbitrator not a party to the
proceeding. 34
A party must present clear and convincing evidence of bias before a court
524. 107 I11. App. 3d at 801-02, 438 N.E.2d at 511-12.
525. Id. at 801-03, 438 N.E.2d at 512-13.
526. Id. at 803, 438 N.E.2d at 513.
527. 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254 (1983).
528. Id. at 346, 662 P.2d at 1259-60.
529. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412 (1982) is identical to UAA § 12.
530. 233 Kan. at 344, 662 P.2d at 1259.
531. 64 Pa. Commw. 481, 440 A.2d 707 (1982).
532. Id. at -, 440 A.2d at 708.
533. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 170(b) (Purdon 1963), provides that, "The court
shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbi-
tration . . . where there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitra-
tors, or any of them."
534. 64 Pa. Commw. at , 440 A.2d at 708.
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will vacate an award on the basis of partiality or prejudice.15 A court will be
reluctant to vacate an award unless presented with direct and definite evidence
that a party was denied a full and impartial arbitration hearing.
3. Fraud
Fraud is a recognized ground for vacation of an award under the UAA.5 8
Courts have required that the fraud be established by clear and convincing
evidence.
In Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products, Inc.,58 7 the court held that an alleged
ex parte communication by one of the parties to the arbitrators was not suffi-
cient evidence of fraud to support vacation of the award. The defendant al-
leged that plaintiff sent a letter to the arbitrators on the day the arbitrators
were to discuss the evidence. Defendant argued. that the letter was an ex parte
communication that influenced that arbitrators to decide in plaintiff's favor
and that the award was therefore procured by fraud, corruption, and other
undue means.5 86 The court found that the evidence did not demonstrate that
the letter affected the arbitrators' decision.5 9" The record disclosed that the
arbitrators did not even read the letter, so the court refused to vacate the
award on grounds of fraud.5 '
4. Other Grounds
The UAA requires judicial confirmation of an award unless specified stat-
utory grounds for vacation or modification are found. In Salter v. Farner,5"
the court held that the failure of the arbitrators to take an oath before com-
mencing their deliberations is not a ground upon which an award can be va-
cated.5 4' The arbitrators were not required by Colorado law or the arbitration
agreement to take an oath."" The court decided that the award could not be
vacated because the UAA requires courts to confirm arbitration awards unless
specified statutory grounds for vacation or modification are found."'
IX. APPEALS
UAA section 19 specifies the conditions under which appeals from court
535. E.g., Saville, 107 I11. App. 3d at 800, 438 N.E.2d at 511.
536. UAA § 12(a)(1).
537. 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254 (1983).
538. Id. at 346, 662 P.2d at 1261.
539. Id. at 346, 662 P.2d at 1260-61.
540. Id. at 346, 662 P.2d at 1261.
541. 653 P.2d 413 (Colo. 1982).
542. 653 P.2d at 414.
543. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 et seq. (1973).
544. 653 P.2d at 414.
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orders and judgments may be brought."' Courts follow several general rules
to determine the appealability of lower court orders. When arbitration is con-
ducted pursuant to a statute, a court order confirming an arbitration award is
appealable."" So is an order granting a petition to enforce the arbitrating
agreement."" In at least one case, however, an appeal from a trial court order
compelling arbitration was held premature because the order from which the
appeal was taken was not final.5"s A party appealing from an arbitration
award is not required to demonstrate that the appeal is taken in good faith."'
In Florida, the common law writ of certiorari is an appropriate method
for review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration where the right
to arbitration exists.'5 0 The rationale is that forcing a party to wait until a
final judgment is entered to appeal the order denying arbitration is an inade-
quate remedy. 51 If the trial judge denies a motion to compel arbitration with-
out prejudice in order to study the complaint and answer, a petition for writ of
certiorari is premature and must be denied.552
In Hiller v. Allstate Insurance Co.," 3 the court held that a court order
545. Under UAA § 19(a), an appeal may be taken from: (1) an order denying
an application to compel arbitration under Section 2; (2) an order granting an applica-
tion to stay arbitration made under section 2(b); (3) an order confirming or denying
confirmation of an award; (4) an order modifying or correcting an award; (5) an order
vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or (6) a judgment or decree entered
pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Section 19(b) provides that appeals are to be
taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in civil
actions.
546. Hiller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 Pa. Super. 149, -, 446 A.2d 273, 274
(1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7320 (Purdon 1982).
547. Brennan v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 307 Pa. Super.
288, -, 453 A.2d 356, 357 (1982) (citing Wilson v. Keystone Ins. Co., 289 Pa.
Super. 101, 432 A.2d 1071 (1981)).
548. Frontier Materials, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 663 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 et. seq. (Supp. 1982).
549. Belsky v. Rutenberg, 297 Pa. Super. 397, -, , 443 A.2d 1181, 1182
(1983) (citing Dickerson v. Hudson, 223 Pa. Super. 415, 302 A.2d 444, (1973)). The
Belsky case involved an interpretation of Rule 180, VII (A) (1) of the Arbitration
Rules of Philadelphia County rather than Pennsylvania's statutory version of the
U.A.A., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301 (Purdon 1982). See Belsky v. Rutenberg,
297 Pa. Super. at ., 443 A.2d at 1182 n.1. The Dickerson case involved a statutory
predecessor to Pennsylvania's current version of the U.A.A.
550. Lipton Professional Soccer, Inc. v. Mijatovic, 416 So. 2d 1236, 1236 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Lucas, 411 So. 2d 1369,
1371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
551. Lucas, 411 So. 2d at 1370.
552. Calloway Homes, Inc. v. Smiley, 422 So. 2d 49, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
553. Hiller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 Pa. Super. 149, 446 A.2d 273 (1982); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7320 (Purdon 1982).
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confirming an arbitration award is appealable where arbitration is conducted
pursuant to statute.5 " Hiller appealed from an order denying his petition to
confirm an arbitration award. Arbitration was required by the uninsured mo-
torist clause in his automobile insurance policy. The court held that appeala-
bility of an order depends on the type of arbitration involved. The court found
that the arbitration clause in the policy provided for common law arbitration.
Therefore, the trial court order denying appellant's petition to confirm the ar-
bitration award was not appealable because the appellant was not out of court
and because there was no statute or rule making the order appealable.58
In Frontier Materials, Inc. v. City of Boulder,"' an appeal from a trial
court order compelling arbitration was deemed premature because the order
was not final." 7 The court determined that a court order compelling parties to
arbitrate is not one of the specified orders from which an appeal may be taken
under UAA section 19. Therefore, defendant's appeal was dismissed without
prejudice.55 8
In Belsky v. Rutenberg," the court held that a party appealing from an
arbitration award is not required to demonstrate that the appeal is taken in
good faith."0 Belsky involved an appeal from a lower court order which
quashed defendants' appeal from an adverse arbitration award rendered at a
hearing which they did not attend. The lower court denied defendants' appeal
on the ground that the appeal was not taken in good faith." The appellate
court reversed because the lower court did not have the authority to inquire
into the good faith of the defendants' appeal." 2
Lipton Professional Soccer, Inc. v. Mijatovic,"8 held that the common
law writ of certiorari is an appropriate procedural device to obtain review of
an order denying a motion to compel arbitration."' The appellate court de-
cided that an employment contract between the parties explicitly required
binding arbitration of disputes arising under the contract. Consequently, Lip-
554. Hiller, 300 Pa. Super. at -, 446 A.2d at 274.
555. Id. at -, 446 A.2d at 274 (citing Capezio & Things, Inc. v. Wynnewood
Meredith Corp., 455 Pa. 84, 314 A.2d 20 (1974); P. Agnes, Inc. v. Philadelphia Police
Home Ass'n, 439 Pa. 448, 266 A.2d 696, (1970)).
556. Frontier Materials, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 663 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983).
557. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 et seq. (Supp. 1982).
558. 663 P.2d at 1066.
559. Belsky v. Rutenberg, 297 Pa. Super. 397, 443 A.2d 1181 (1983).
560. Id. at , 443 A.2d at 1182.
561. Id. at -, 443 A.2d at 1182. The lower court apparently concluded that
the defendants had ignored the arbitration hearing because they thought their right of
appeal was absolute.
562. Id. at -, 443 A.2d at 1182.
563. Lipton Professional Soccer, Inc. v. Mijatovic, 416 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
564. Id. at 1236.
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ton's petition for certiorari was granted, the lower court's order was quashed,
and the case was remanded with instructions that the dispute between the
parties be remitted to arbitration proceedings.51
The common law writ of certiorari was also held to be an appropriate
device for obtaining review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration
in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Lucas.566 Lucas had two accounts
with the brokerage firm, but only one account agreement provided for arbitra-
tion of any disputes. Lucas sued the firm on a claim arising exclusively from
its handling of the non-arbitrable account. When the firm's motion to compel
arbitration was denied, it sought a writ of certiorari to review the non-final
order of the trial court."' The appellate court denied the writ on the ground
that no right of arbitration existed.5" The court recognized, however, that a
writ of certiorari is a proper method to obtain review of a lower court's order
denying a motion to compel arbitration.56 9 The court reasoned that permitting
the parties to litigate where there is a right to arbitration completely frustrates
that right. Forcing a party to wait until final judgment is entered to appeal an
order denying arbitration is an inadequate remedy.
5 7 0
In Calloway Homes, Inc. v. Smiley, 571 the court held that a petition for
writ of certiorari is premature and must be denied when the trial judge denies
a motion to compel arbitration without prejudice in order to study more fully
the complaint and answer .5 7 Smiley executed an agreement which obligated
Calloway to build a house for him. Smiley alleged that this agreement pro-
vided for arbitration of all disputes. The trial court denied without prejudice
Smiley's motion to compel arbitration during a pretrial hearing so that the
court could review the pleadings in the case. Rather than wait for a determi-
native ruling from the trial court, Smiley filed a petition for a writ of certio-
rari. The appellate court held the petition to be premature under the
circumstances. 7 8
565. Id. at 1237. Although the court cited a section of Florida's arbitration stat-
ute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.03 (1981), it noted that this staute may not have been
applicable. The court pointed out, however, that "the obligation to arbitrate persists
through federal law, [9 U.S.C. §§ 1 (1982)) and Florida courts are bound to enforce
that obligation." 416 So. 2d at 1237.
566. Paine, Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Lucas, 411 So. 2d 1369, 1371
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
567. Id. at 1370.
568. Id. at 1371.
569. In a concurring opinion, Judge Cowart agreed with the result reached by
the majority---denial of the writ of certiorari-but disagreed that a writ of certiorari is
a proper remedy under these circumstances. In his opinion, an appeal from final judg-
ment provided an adequate remedy. Id. at 1371 (Cowart, J,. concurring).
570. Id. at 1370.
571. 422 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
572. Id. at 50.
573. Id. at 49-50.
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Under the UAA, a valid arbitration agreement confers jurisdiction on the
courts to enforce,5 7 4 confirm,5 5 correct, modify, or vacate 7 6 the award. In
Kemling v. Country Mutual Insurance Co, 5 77 the court held that a court's
jurisdiction over a dispute is created by the existence of an enforceable arbi-
tration agreement.5 7 8 The plaintiff's insurance contract stated that any issue
concerning an uninsured motorist's negligence would be submitted to binding
arbitration. After an award in plaintiff's favor, the defendant argued that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction under the UAA to compel arbitration . 5 7 Al-
though the appellate court vacated the award on other grounds, it decided that
the trial court had jurisdiction to compel arbitration because the insurance
contract clearly provided for arbitration.'o
In Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin,"1 the court ruled that an at-
tack on the validity of the arbitration agreement is a direct attack on the juris-
diction of the arbitrator to settle the dispute.5 82 A commercial arbitration
award in plaintiff's favor was entered after the defendant failed to appear for
arbitration. When plaintiff sought to have the award confirmed, the defendant
raised the invalidity of the agreement as a defense. The appellate court held
that the arbitration agreement is the jurisdiction-granting element for arbitra-
tion,"' and that defendant's invalidity defense could be raised for the first
time when judicial confirmation of the award was sought.'
B. Procedural Matters
In State v. Thomas Construction Co.,'88 the court held that the parties to
an arbitration agreement may displace the rules of civil procedure with their
own rules.5 88 The parties had agreed to arbitrate by the Construction Industry
574. UAA § 17.
575. UAA § 11.
576. UAA §§ 12, 13.
577. 107 Ill. App. 3d 516, 437 N.E.2d 1253 (1982).
578. Id. at 519, 437 N.E.2d at 1253.
579. Id. at 519, 437 N.E.2d at 1255.
580. Id. at 521, 437 N.E.2d at 1257. The trial and appellate courts treated the
particular proceeding as a suit for declatory judgment. Id.
581. 414 Mich. 95, 323 N.W. 2d 1 (1982).
582. Id. at 98, 323 N.W.2d at 2.
583. Id.
584. This decision is a logical extension of the principle that a party or court
may question the court's subject matter jurisdiction to settle a dispute at any time
before final disposition of the case by the court.
585. 8 Kan. App. 2d 283, 655 P.2d 471 (1982).
586. Id. at __, 655 P.2d at 475.
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Arbitration Rules of the AAA. The court decided that the Kansas Rules of
Civil Procedure were inapplicable to matters covered by the construction in-
dusty's rules based on the terms of the parties' contract and the language of
the construction industry rules.5 87
In Cres Rivera Concrete Co v. Bill Stuckman Construction Co.,'" a
bankruptcy court held that an arbitration agreement is enforceable even
though one party has filed for bankruptcy before arbitration begins., The
plaintiff declared bankruptcy after completing construction work but before
receiving payment from defendant. When the trustee requested payment, de-
fendant refused to pay because it argued that it had agreed with plaintiff to
resolve any disputes through arbitration. The bankruptcy court, applying New
Mexico law, 5  ordered arbitration to proceed between defendant and the
trustee. 91
C. Venue
In Hedron Construction Co. v. District Board of Trustees,59 2 the court
held that a Florida statute establishing a particular venue for arbitration ac-
tions displaced the general venue provision. The college board of trustees filed
a petition to stay arbitration of the dispute involving itself and Hedron, and
the construction company moved to transfer the venue of the arbitration pro-
ceeding pursuant to a special venue statute for arbitration." 3 The lower court
denied this motion because it reasoned that the venue of an arbitration hearing
is the same as for any other civil action. The appellate court reversed because
a suit brought under a specific state statute creating special venue rules over-
rides the general venue statute."'
D. Standing
The court held in Computer Corp. of America v. Zarecor5"5 that only the
parties to a contract which contains an arbitration clause have standing to
compel arbitration. Defendant sought to compel plaintiff to arbitrate based on
a contract executed by plaintiff and defendant, who was then acting as a pro-
moter for an unformed corporation. The contract indicated that neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant intended for defendant to be a party to the con-
tract. The court held that defendant lacked standing to compel plaintiff to
587. Id. at -, 655 P.2d at 475.
588. 21 Bankr. 155 (D.N.M. 1982).
589. Id. at 158.
590. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (1978).
591. 21 Bankr. at 156.
592. 420 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
593. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.19 (West Supp. 1983).
594. Hedron, 420 So. 2d at 393.
595. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 452 N.E.2d 267 (1983).
(Vol. 1984
64
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1984, Iss.  [1984], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1984/iss/13
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
arbitrate because defendant was not a party to the contract.M"
XI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
In contrast to the review of a trial, judicial review of an arbitration award
is much more limited. Ordinarily, arbitration awards are viewed with great
deference. They cannot be upset except under exceptional circumstances. For
example, an award usually will not be set aside for mistakes of law or fact.
Judicial review is limited to the grounds established by the jurisdiction's arbi-
tration statute5 97 because the parties have chosen arbitration to settle their
disputes. A limited scope of review encourages parties to arbitrate by giving
arbitral awards finality."$ Because appellate review is limited, the person mov-
ing to modify or vacate the award must prove by clear, precise and convincing
evidence that action by the court is warranted.'"
In Daniels Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Jordan,600 the court examined the
jurisdiction of courts to review arbitration awards. The UAA grants courts
jurisdiction to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an arbitration award."' The
parties submitted an employment dispute to arbitration, and the contract pro-
vided that any disputes were to be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the rules of the AAA. The arbitrator entered an award for Jordan, and
Daniels filed a motion to vacate or modify the award.60' The trial court ap-
plied AAA rules and found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The ap-
pellate court held that the AAA rules could not regulate judicial proceedings
and that the UAA therefore governed judicial review of an award .6 8
In In re Arbitration between Johns Construction Co. and Unified School
District No. 210,604 the court held that where the parties have a binding arbi-
tration agreement, errors of law and fact or an erroneous decision of matters
submitted to the arbitrators are insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and
honestly made. Unless there is fraud, misconduct, or other valid objections,
nothing related to the merits of the action can constitute grounds for setting
aside the award. 6"' The school board appealed from an arbitration award on
the theory that it was denied a fair hearing because the arbitrators excluded
all witnesses from the hearing except when they were testifying. The court
596. Id. at __ , 452 N.E.2d at 269.
597. Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, 110 111. App. 3d 217, 223, 441 N.E.2d
1333, 1337 (1982).
598. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
599. Ronwin v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 113 111. App. 3d 687, 692-93,
447 N.E.2d 954, 958 (1983).
600. 99 N.M. 297, 657 P.2d 624 (1982).
601. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-11 to -13 (1978).
602. 99 N.M at 298, 657 P.2d at 625.
603. Id. at 299, 657 P.2d at 626.
604. 233 Kan. 527, 664 P.2d 821 (1983).
605. Id. at 528, 664 P,2d at 822.
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found that the arbitrators excluded all witnesses of both parties and that arbi-
trators have the discretionary power to exclude witnesses during the testimony
of other witnesses. The court did not find any fraud, misconduct, or improper
action by the arbitrators that denied the school board a fair fiearing.eo
In City of Hot Springs v. Gundersons's, Inc.," 7 the court considered
whether the UAA requires arbitration to be compelled when it is undisputed
that an agreement to arbitrate exists and the opposing party refuses to arbi-
trate. The court decided that the UAA permits a court to consider only three
factors in making its decision: whether an arbitration agreement exists;
whether the agreement imposes a duty on the defendant to arbitrate; and
whether the defendant breached this duty.608 If there is doubt as to whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists, it should be resolved in favor of arbitration."'0
Phelps-Benz was under contract with Hot Springs to design and supervise the
construction of the city's golf course. Gunderson's contracted with the City to
build the course. After problems with the underground sprinkler system at the
course were discovered, the City filed suit against the architect and the con-
tractor for breach of their respective contracts. Gunderson's moved to compel
arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion because Phelps-Benz's con-
tract did not contain an arbitration clause and it therefore could not be com-
pelled to arbitrate. The trial court wanted to prevent multiple suits from aris-
ing out of the same factual setting. The appellate court held that denial of
Gunderson's motion was error because the trial court considered something
other than the three factors in reaching its decision. The appellate court or-
dered arbitration to proceed because the parties did not contest that the dis-
pute between the City and Gunderson's was subject to arbitration. 1 0
The bankruptcy court in Cres Rivera Concrete Co. v. Bill Stuckman Con-
struction Co.6" held that the UAA limited it to a determination of whether
there is an agreement to arbitrate unless the arbitration agreement limits ar-
eas or matters to be arbitrated."1' There was a conflict over whether arbitra-
tion was to be conducted pursuant to American Arbitration Association rules
or the UAA, but both parties agreed that the dispute was subject to arbitra-
tion. The court construed the ambiguities in the contract against the drafters
and ordered the parties to proceed with arbitration.613
Taunton Municipal Light Plant Commission v. Paul L. Geiringer & As-
606. Id. at 530, 664 P.2d at 823.
607. 322 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1982).
608. Id. at 11.
609. Id. at 10.
610. Id. at 11.
611. 21 Bankr. 155 (D.N.M. 1982).
612. Id. at 157 (citing K.L. House Constr. Co.-v. City of Albuquerque, 91 N.M.
492, 576 P.2d 752 (1978) which interpreted N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1,-2E (1978)).
613. Id. at 157.
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sociates,° " discussed the standards for judicial review of arbitration awards.
An arbitration award may not offend public policy, require a result contrary to
an express statutory provision, or exceed the limits of the contract containing
the arbitration clause. Within these limitations, however, arbitrators have
broad authority to fashion remedies. If arbitrators commit an error of law or
fact in deciding issues properly before them, a court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the arbitrator. Even if arbitrators commit a gross error of
law or fact, the decision is binding on the parties in the absence of fraud.' 1"
Arbitration awards are viewed with great deference, and courts will not in-
quire into the merits of an award that the parties agreed the arbitrator could
make. The arbitrators decided that Taunton was responsible for obtaining all
required drawings from prime contractors and delivery of those drawings to
Geiringer. The consulting agreement between the parties, however, required
Geiringer to provide those drawings to Taunton. Consequently, Taunton asked
the trial court to overturn the arbitrator's decision as incongruous, violative of
the contract, and exceeding the scope of the arbitrators' authority. The appel-
late court decided that Geiringer was still required to provide drawings to
Taunton as the contract provided, but only after Taunton had delivered the
drawings to Geiringer. The arbitrators simply required Taunton to deliver
drawings to Geiringer as a condition precedent to Geiringer's redelivery of the
same drawings to Taunton. The court held that the arbitrators' decision did
not exceed the scope of their authority or violate the terms of the submission
presented for arbitration6'6 and that the arbitrators made no error of law or
fact of sufficient gravity to justify setting aside the award. 1 7
In Loomis v. Cudahy,'18 the court held that a hearing on a motion to
compel or stay arbitration must be limited to examining whether there is an
agreement to arbitrate.61 9 Cudahy and Loomis executed a real estate construc-
tion contract that contained an arbitration clause. When a dispute arose,
Cudahy opposed arbitration on the ground that the agreement was no longer
valid because it specifically required the house to be built on a particular lot
and the house was built on another lot. The trial court refused to consider her
argument because her testimony went to the issue of whether the contract was
performed and not to its validity. The trial court reasoned that evidence of a
breach of contract does not invalidate a contract. Therefore, a valid agreement
to arbitrate existed between the parties even if the contract itself was breached
by nonperformance. The appellate court affirmed because the record did not
disclose that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous.620
614. 560 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass.), aff'd mem., 725 F2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983).
615. Id. at 1252.
616. Id. at 1251.
617. Id. at 1253.
618. 104 Idaho 106, 656 P.2d 1359 (1982).
619. Id. at , 656 P.2d at 1362.
620. Id. at , 656 P.2d at 1363.
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In Bingham County Commission v. Interstate Electric Co.,62" the court
declared that judicial review of arbitration decisions is more limited than re-
view of judicial proceedings. 622 On issues of both law and fact, the arbitrator is
the final judge. 2 The contract in this case contemplated recovery of damages
for delay on a construction contract caused by the county, and the parties
submitted their dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the county
was responsible for delay that caused the electric company financial loss. The
county argued that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in awarding the electric
company damages. The appellate court confirmed the award because the arbi-
trator's award decided the dispute submitted by the parties under a reasonable
construction of the contract.?
In contrast to the majority of states, Michigan does not follow the general
rule that errors of law are insufficient to vacate an arbitration award. In De-
troit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Standfest,'" the court set out
the standard of review to be employed by Michigan courts acting on a motion
to vacate or confirm an award. A Michigan statute specifies that the courts
retain all their equitable powers over arbitration proceedings."' Thus, the
court held that vacation is proper where it clearly appears that the arbitrators
have arrived at an erroneous conclusion because of an error of law and that,
but for the error, the award would have been substantially different."' The
insurance exchange contended that arbitration awards against it should be va-
cated because the arbitrators exceeded their powers by refusing to enforce the
"anti-stacking" language of an insurance contract. The court held that be-
cause an unambiguous provision precluded stacking benefits, the awards were
erroneous as a matter of law.6 "
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Stuckey,'" the court
denied State Farm's claim that the arbitrators exceeded their powers in refus-
ing to apply a dead man's statute to bar Stuckey's testimony. 8 Stuckey was
involved in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist, and he sought
to recover under his insurance policy with the defendant. The uninsured mo-
torist died before Stuckey's claim against defendant was submitted to arbitra-
tion. At the proceedings, the defendant sought to bar Stuckey's testimony. The
arbitators refused to apply the dead man's statute and allowed Stuckey to tes-
tify. The contract provided that arbitration should be conducted in accordance
621. 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983).
622. Id. at -, 665 P.2d at 1051.
623. Id. at -, 665 P.2d at 1052.
624. Id. at -, 665 P.2d at 1052.
625. 416 Mich. 407, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982).
626. Id. at 418, 331 N.W.2d at 423 (citing MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
600.5035 (1968)).
627. Id. at 445, 331 N.W.2d at 434.
628. Id. at 434, 331 N.W.2d at 426-27.
629. 112 Ii. App. 3d 647, 445 N.E.2d 791 (1983).
630. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (1981).
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with the usual rules governing procedure and admission of evidence. The court
held that an arbitrator's award cannot be set aside because of an error in
judgment or a mistake of law or fact made by him. 6s ' The court rejected State
Farm's claim that the arbitrators exceeded their powers by refusing to apply
an applicable evidentiary rule at the arbitration hearing, contrary to the ex-
press provisions of the insurance contract."3 2 It reasoned that this case involved
statutory interpretation by the arbitrator, which is a decision of law and thus
unreviewable by the courts.633
In Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club,63" the court held that an arbitra-
tion award will be vacated where upholding the award would violate public
policy.' 3 ' Konicki was part owner of the OBRC Corporation, an athletic club.
OBRC agreed with him to assume his interests in the club, and the agreement
required Konicki not to establish a competing business within ten square miles
of the Club. Two years later, Konicki set up a competitive establishment
within the area. The arbitrators decided that the non-competition clause was
valid, and OBRC was awarded damages.63 6 The court decided that it would
not enforce a private agreement which is repugnant to public policy whether
the court reviews the decision after litigation or arbitration. 63 7 The court held
that non-competition clauses will only be enforced after the court considers the
reasonableness of the time and location restrictions and the proprietary inter-
est to be protected because such clauses frequently violate public policy.638
In Bernard v. Hemisphere Hotel Management, Inc., 3 9 the court held that
a lower court's order requiring arbitration proceedings continue with two of
the three arbitrators was reviewable." ° Plaintiff and defendant submitted a
dispute to arbitration, and the proceedings were conducted in accordance with
the rules of the AAA. Once proceedings were begun, the parties learned an
arbitrator had been convicted of various crimes, and defendant moved to have
him removed as unfit under an AAA rule."' The lower court ordered the arbi-
trator's removal, and the AAA removed him two days later. The appellate
court reversed the lower court's order because arbitrators have the power to
631. 112 Ill. App. 3d at 651, 445 N.E.2d at 792.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 652, 445 N.E.2d at 794.
634. 110 Ill. App. 3d 217, 441 N.E.2d 1333 (1982).
635. Id. at 223-24, 441 N.E.2d 1338.
636. Id. at 218-19, 441 N.E.2d at 1334-1335.
637. Id. at 223, 441 N.E. 2d at 1337 (quoting Board of Trustees v. Cook County
College Teacher Union, Local 1600, 74 Ill. 2d 412, 424, 386 N.E.2d 47, 52 (1979)).
638. Id.
639. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 450 N.E.2d 1084 (1983).
640. Id. at - , 450 N.E.2d at 1085.
641. This rule states that, "if any arbitrator should . . . be disqualified . . . the
American Arbitration Association may, on proof satisfactory to it, declare the office
vacant. Vacancies shall be filled. . . and the matter shall be reheard unless the parties
shall agree otherwise." Id. at __ , 450 N.E.2d at 1085.
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interpret arbitration rules. By ordering the arbitrator's removal, the lower
court preempted a decision by the AAA." 2 It would have been a different
matter if the Association had decided to allow the arbitrator to act as an arbi-
trator and a party had then moved for judicial action. In that event, a lower
court could justify removal of the arbitrator under the UAA." 8
In Ragin v. Royale Globe Insurance Co.,6" the court held that awards
based on an egregious mistake of law must be vacated." 5 A car driven by
Ragin collided with another vehicle, and Ragin was injured. The other driver's
insurance company paid him $15,000. Ragin felt that this amount did not
fully compensate him. Because $15,000 was the maximum amount that he
could recover from the other driver's insurance policy, he filed a claim against
his own automobile insurer to recover more money. Ragin argued that because
the other driver was underinsured, he (Ragin) should be able to collect under
the underinsured motorist provision of his policy. The arbitrator awarded him
an additional $15,000. After that award was vacated by a lower court, Ragin
appealed. The appellate court first held that under Pennsylvania law, a driver
who carries the legal minimum amount of liability insurance coverage, al-
though possibly underinsured, is not uninsured. This was critically important
to the court because Ragin could only collect under his policy if the other
driver was uninsured." 6 Because of the wording of Ragin's policy, the court
held that Ragin could collect nothing from his insurer. The court justified its
decision by observing that under Pennsylvania law, a reviewing court can cor-
rect or modify an award where "the award is contrary to law and such that
had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have entered a different judg-
ment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict."" 7 The court upheld the
lower court's decision to vacate the award under that standard of review.4
8
Courts conduct only a limited review of arbitration awards because the
parties have chosen to resolve their dispute by a method other than traditional
litigation. Because of the nature of that process, arbitrators have greater inde-
pendence to decide disputes without judicial scrutiny. Mistakes of law or fact
642. Id. at __ , 450 N.E.2d at 1086.
643. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983). This section
parallels UAA § 12(a)(2), which allows the court to vacate an award where "[t]here
was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of
the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party." UAA § 12(a)(2).
644. 461 A.2d 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
645. Id. at 859. Pennsylvania law sets the minimum amount of liability insur-
ance coverage at $15,000 per person. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1009.104(a) (Purdon
1974).
646. 461 A.2d at 857.
647. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(a)(2) (Purdon 1982).
648. Although the UAA does not have this same provision, § 12(a)(3) allows an
award to be vacated where arbitrators have exceeded their powers. It can be argued
that rendering an award contrary to law is the equivalent of "exceeding their powers"
within the meaning of the UAA provision.
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that might be error in a judicial setting are sometimes ignored because the
courts presume the parties wanted the arbitrator's decision, whether it is the
same decision a court might reach or not. Such a limited scope of review for
arbitration awards is necessary to promote the purpose of arbitration: to pro-
vide a speedy and efficient method of resolving disputes without resort to liti-
gation. If the arbitration process is simply a prelude to a searching judicial
review of the arbitration award, that goal is not achieved because the inevita-
ble delays and inefficiencies of the judicial process become engrafted onto the
arbitration process as well. Recent cases indicate that arbitration awards are
accorded a greater degree of finality by reviewing courts than similar judicial
decisions. An important purpose of arbitration is to reduce the amount of time
and money required to settle disputes. By extending great deference to arbitra-
tors' decisions and promoting the finality of those decisions, courts further that
purpose by discouraging parties from resorting to litigation after arbitration is
over.
XII. TIMELINESS
A. Demand for Arbitration
In City of Dearborn v. Freemen-Darling, Inc.," 9 the court ruled that it is
for the arbitrator to decide whether a demand for arbitration is brought within
a reasonable time. 50 Freemen contracted with Dearborn to renovate city hall.
After an award in defendant's favor, plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred
in allowing the arbitrator to determine whether the demand for arbitration
was made within a reasonable time. The appellate court held that the reasona-
bleness of the plaintiff's delay was a question of fact to be decided by the
arbitrator."'
B. Motions to Vacate
Even if a party's motion to vacate has substantive merit, a court may still
deny the motion if it is not made in a timely fashion. The UAA establishes
time limits during which a motion to vacate must be filed.652 Courts strictly
apply the limits because rigid compliance promotes arbitration and ensures
prompt challenges to awards. At least one court, however, has refused to inter-
pret the time restrictions strictly. It held that a party loses its absolute right to
proceed when it makes an untimely motion, but a court does not lose its dis-
649. 119 Mich. App. 439, 326 N.W.2d 831 (1982).
650. Id. at 444, 326 N.W.2d at 834.
651. Id.
652. UAA § 12 (a)(1) provides, "Upon application of a party, the court shall
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cretion to permit the untimely motion. "
In Bernstein v. Gramercy Mills Inc.,'" the court refused to vacate an
arbitration award because defendant's motion to vacate was made after the
thirty-day statutory limit had expired.6" The court strictly construed the lan-
guage of the arbitration statute to promote the finality of arbitration
awards.151 The defendant argued that his attack was timely because it was in
the form of a counterclaim and not an application to vacate. The court re-
jected this distinction.6 5 7
In Haskell v. Forest Land & Timber Co.,658 the court held that a party
seeking to vacate an award must take some affirmative action to obtain relief
within the statutory time period. The party seeking to vacate the award did
not file a motion to vacate until two and one-half years after the arbitration
award was entered. The lower court allowed the party to challenge the award
in this manner. The appellate court reversed because the arbitration statute
made it clear to the court that the legislature sought to limit the grounds for
overturning an award and to require challenges to awards to be initiated
promptly.659
In Bingham County Commission v. Interstate Electric Co., 0 the court
held that failure to comply with the statutory time limits when seeking to
vacate an arbitration award absolutely bars a motion to vacate." 1 The arbitra-
tor entered the award on February 9, 1980, but the county did not seek to
vacate the award until January 5, 1981. The court held that the motion to
vacate was untimely and should have been denied by the trial court because
the motion was not made until nearly eleven months after the arbitrator's de-
cision was issued. The court held that a court cannot extend this ninety-day
period even if the party seeking to vacate the award asserts a valid ground
under the applicable statute." 2
Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Gavin"3 did not follow
the general rule that an untimely motion prevents a court from vacating an
award. Instead, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a court in its discre-
tion may permit an untimely motion to vacate upon a showing of excusable
653. See, e.g., Salter v. Farner, 653 P.2d 413 (Colo. 1982).
654. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 452 N.E.2d 231 (1983).
655. Id. at -, 452 N.E.2d at 234-35.
656. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch 251, § 12 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
657. 16 Mass. App. Ct. at __ , 452 N.E.2d at 235-36.
658. 408 So. 2d 811 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
659. Id. at 812.
660. 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983).
661. Id. at __,665 P.2d at 1049. IDAHO CODE § 7-912(b) (1979) is identical
to UAA § 12(b).
662. Id. at -, 665 P.2d at 1049.
663. 416 Mich. 407, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982).
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neglect.' The motion to vacate the award was filed three days after the
twenty-day statutory time limit had expired. 665 The circuit court and the court
of appeals both denied the motion to vacate on the ground that it was not
timely filed. On appeal to the supreme court, the party opposing vacation ar-
gued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion to vacate
because it was not filed in a timely manner. The court reviewed the explicit
language of the twenty-day rule and the policy behind it6" and concluded that
the rule does not curtail a circuit judge's discretionary power to permit a party
to file a motion to vacate beyond established time limits upon a showing of
excusable neglect." 7 The court emphasized that since the delay was only three
days and the defendant was not prejudiced by permitting the delayed filing,
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by entertaining the untimely mo-
tion to vacate the arbitration award.
6
"
C. Appeals from an Award
In Meade v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 66 9 the court held that
the ninety-day statutory limit on filing appeals from arbitration awards does
not apply -to issues that were not submitted to the arbitration panel.67 0 An
insurance company wanted to challenge an arbitration award because it ex-
ceeded the policy limits. The trial court refused to let the insurance company
raise the excessiveness defense because the ninety-day limit had expired. The
appellate court reversed because the ninety day rule was not applicable. The
court reasoned that the insurance company's defense was proper because it
had not been presented to the arbitration panel.
671
In Farmer v. Polen, 67 the court held that a party cannot rescind a con-
tract containing an arbitration agreement if he fails to challenge the validity
of the arbitration agreement within the statutory time period established for
filing appeals. 67 8 Plaintiff-employee obtained an arbitration award against de-
fendant-employer, and he filed a petition to confirm the award after defendant
unsuccessfully attempted to have the award modified. The employer counter-
claimed for breach of contract. The trial court denied the counterclaim, and
664. Id. at 424-25, 331 N.W.2d at 426.
665. MIcH. COMP. LAw ANN. § 769.9(2) (1967) provides that an application to
vacate an award "shall be made within 20 days after delivery of a copy of the award to
the applicant."
666. The court stated that the policy behind the rule is to move disputes in a
timely fashion through the judicial process. 416 Mich. at 423, 331 N.W.2d at 425.
667. See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 108.7(2) (1967).
668. 416 Mich. at 423, 331 N.W.2d at 425.
669. 423 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1982).
670. Id. at 909.
671. Id. at 910.
672. 423 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
673. Id. at 1037.
1984]
73
et al.: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act Student Project
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
280 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1984
the employer filed an amended answer seeking rescission of the contract. The
answer asking for that relief was filed after the ninety day statutory time pe-
riod had expired. The trial court refused to confirm plaintiff's arbitration
award. The appellate court reversed and directed the trial judge to confirm the
arbitration award because defendant had never challenged either the validity
of the arbitration clause or the arbitration proceedings until plaintiff moved to
confirm the award. The court decided that defendant's actions of participating
in the the earlier arbitration proceeding and initially only seeking to modify
the award were inconsistent with an intention to seek rescission of the original
employment contract.674 It reasoned that by failing to timely challenge the
validity of either the arbitration agreement or the subsequent arbitration pro-
ceedings, the employer had ratified and confirmed the contract. 7 1
XIII. CONCLUSION
Courts appear to be interpreting the UAA so as to promote arbitration.
Recent cases demonstrate that courts are enforcing arbitration agreements and
limiting the opportunities of parties to resort to litigation when such an agree-
ment exists.
Substantively, courts have broadly interpreted arbitration clauses to en-
compass more disputes by using the same rules of construction applicable to
contracts. The doctrine of waiver has been restrictively applied. When parties
have agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration, their agreement is given
full effect absent fraud, duress, or some other contract defense. Only when a
strong state policy exists favoring litigation of certain claims will a court re-
fuse to require arbitration of a claim covered by an arbitration agreement.
Procedurally, courts have limited a party's right to stay arbitration and
have strongly favored compelling arbitration when a valid arbitration agree-
ment exists. When litigation is necessary, courts are willing to sever those
claims that must be litigated and compel arbitration of the rest of the dispute.
Once a party has obtained an arbitration award, courts are very reluctant
to change it. Arbitrators are normally peculiarly competent to adjudge the
merits of a dispute because they are familiar with the parties, business, or
industry involved. Therefore, judicial review of arbitration awards is limited
because an arbitration award is viewed with great deference. The finality of
arbitration awards is such that most courts will not change an award even if
an arbitrator committed errors of law or fact in reaching his decision. Courts
narrowly construe both the grounds for vacation in the UAA and the defenses
to confirmation proceedings, and no nonstatutory grounds for vacating an
award will be considered. The time limits established by the UAA for filing
motions to vacate are generally strictly applied in order to ensure prompt chal-
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arbitration awards by restricting the ability of a challenger to attack the
award.
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